

Spurious Regressions and Panel IV Estimation: Revisiting the Causes of Conflict

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Abstract: Several recent empirical studies use instrument variables (IV) estimation strategies in panel data to try to identify statistically the causes of violent conflict. We explain how the long-recognized spurious regressions problem can lead to both bias and mistaken inference in panel IV studies given cycles in the time series component of the panel. We illustrate the problem by revisiting two recent, prominent studies that rely for identification on instruments exhibiting opposing cycles over time. The use of shift-share or other interacted instruments does not resolve the bias. When outcome variables are cointegrated with endogenous variables through policy preferences or some other mechanism, the bias can be in the same direction as the reverse causation the IV is meant to resolve. We close by outlining seven practical diagnostic steps researchers can follow to reduce the prospect of spurious regressions confounding panel IV estimation.

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An important thread of quantitative social science strives to identify statistically the causes of violent conflict, a concern of first order importance (Blattman and Miguel 2010, Ray and Esteban 2017). As in so many other areas of empirical research, clean identification of causal mechanisms, even of just reduced form relationships, nonetheless remains challenging. For example, a recent systematic review focusing just on the relationship between development aid and violence identified 9,413 relevant studies, of which only 19 offered even a plausible causal identification strategy, most exploiting spatial discontinuities in within-country data from a single country (Zürcher 2017). Only 5 of the studies Zürcher (2017) reviews address conflict in multiple countries over time using panel data, making plausible the external validity of the findings. The most compelling cross-country studies, such as Nunn and Qian (2014, hereafter NQ), use an instrumental variables (IV) strategy to address the likely endogeneity of the hypothesized causal variable, in NQ's case United States (US) food aid shipments. Other recent studies use similar panel IV methods in cross-country data to analyze non-aid prospective causes of conflict in multi-country data, such as Hull & Imai (2015, hereafter HI), who explore the impact of gross domestic product (GDP) growth on conflict. The estimation strategy HI and NQ (and others) employ relies on achieving identification from interacting a plausibly exogenous time series instrumental variable with a (potentially endogenous) cross-sectional exposure variable(s).¹ The authors argue that they identify the causal effect of inter-annual variation in the time series variable on the outcome of interest by comparing relatively exposed units to relatively unexposed units, in NQ's case by exploiting a well-established shift-share instrument technique originated by Bartik (1991).

Skepticism about this identification strategy naturally focuses on the potentially endogenous shift-share instrument (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. 2018). In this paper, we show,

¹ One could choose any of a host of panel IV papers vulnerable to the spurious regressions issues we raise, on conflict and many other applications. We focus on the NQ and HI papers for a few reasons. First, the authors are exceptionally talented economists publishing in top journals; their papers represent the best current empirical research in the field. This underscores that the problem we address has gone largely unnoticed even among our most talented colleagues and in the discipline's most rigorous peer review processes. Second, two papers is the minimum needed to establish a pattern, not a result specific to a particular paper. We prefer not to flag additional papers so as to avoid the mistaken impression of finger pointing. Third, the papers represent different forms of the broader issue we address. The endogenous regressors in each paper follow a different time series pattern, showing that this issue is not unique to a specific cyclical pattern. Further, one interacts using shift-share (i.e., Bartik) variables, while the other uses several different forms of dichotomous and continuous variables, demonstrating that ours transcends the important shift-share instrument critiques of Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018) or Jaeger et al. (2018). This paper is meant as a caution and some practical guidance to those pursuing panel IV estimation, not as a critique of specific papers or authors.

however, that the seemingly-unobjectionable, exogenous time series instrument poses a problem. In particular, the NQ and HI papers and many others in the conflict literature – and far beyond – that use similar panel IV strategies are vulnerable to the “spurious regression” critique Yule (1926), Slutsky (1937), and Granger and Newbold (1973) made long ago. By ignoring the sequencing of observations in the panel and the resulting non-iid error processes of both the outcome variable and the instrument, inference that assumes iid errors leads to over-rejection of the zero impact null. This finding echoes Phillips and Hansen (1990), who showed that in IV estimation involving cointegrated processes, the relevance condition of IV can sometimes be “satisfied” due to spurious correlation even when instruments are irrelevant due to independence from the endogenous regressor of interest.² In this paper we go one step further to explain and demonstrate how in the panel IV context spurious regressions not only leads to mistaken inference, but also generates biased estimates. Indeed, in the special case of reverse causality between the outcome variable and a cointegrated, endogenous regressor, the bias can match the sign of that reverse causal effect, so that IV estimation reinforces rather than resolves the identification problem in ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation.

In addition to flagging the ongoing relevance of an old literature on spurious regressions that has been largely overlooked in panel IV estimation, our critique complements that of Young (2018), who shows using bootstrap and jackknife how highly leveraged observations (or clusters of observations) can bias downwards estimated standard errors in IV estimation in non-iid error processes. In his setting, the apparent associations reported in IV regressions often arise from over-leveraged observations or clusters for which conventional standard errors do not properly adjust. In our case, the problem is instead identification from a strong correlated trend of unknown pattern and periodicity. Indeed, we show that panel IV estimates that pass Young’s test can still fall prey to spurious regressions.

Our paper likewise complements recent critiques of interacted instruments, including the shift-share (‘Bartik’) IV strategy used by NQ, which focus largely on the exogeneity condition for the instrument, a critique that has salience in our context as well, as we discuss below (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. 2018, Borusyak et al. 2018). Our findings are perhaps closest to those of Jaeger et al. (2018), who point out a ‘dynamic adjustment bias’ in panel IV estimates using

² The effect we study differs from the Nickell (1981) bias in dynamic panel data models that arises not from autocorrelated error processes but rather from the demeaning process, which generates inconsistency.

shift-share instruments that arise from serially correlated processes in the literature on the wage effects of migration, and to Adão et al. (2018), who show via placebo simulations that conventional inference overstates rejection rates of null hypotheses in shift-share designs. Jaeger et al. (2018) base their findings on a specific model of wage dynamics. We show that similar issues arise from time series properties that are common to many economic variables. As we show, the interacted instrument merely rescales the spurious regression bias that is our core concern. Thus, our critique extends well beyond the shift-share designs that have attracted much recent attention. This issue appears unrecognized thus far in the literature, despite widespread use of these panel IV estimation methods, in the conflict literature and beyond.

In section I, we describe the basic approaches employed to estimate the causal determinants of conflict using instrumental variables. Using the NQ and HI papers as examples, we describe the IV approach and show via regressions that replace the chosen instrumental variables with a clearly spurious variable how conventional inference tests can mislead. We then show through Monte Carlo simulations that autocorrelation in conflict leads to unreliable inference by traditional tests of statistical significance, and that IV estimates based on spurious instruments are biased. We investigate in our simulations the performance of robustness checks typically employed, and show that correcting for the known time series properties of both the conflict variable and the instrument avoids problems of both inference and bias that arise when the relevance condition for IV is satisfied by spurious correlation. Using this insight, we re-estimate the NQ and HI specifications, showing that when the first differences correction is used to correct for nonstationarity detected in the underlying data series, the results of the original papers are either overturned or become very imprecise, depending on the specification.³ In section II we demonstrate that the use of interacted instruments in no way obviates the core problem, illustrating this result with the shift-share instrument case from NQ. In section III, we propose seven practical diagnostic steps for how best to avoid spurious regression risk in panel IV estimation. These range from elementary steps – e.g., visually inspecting the data to identify the relevant variation in the time series, or conducting well-established tests for nonstationarity – to more sophisticated diagnostics based on placebo tests and Monte Carlo simulation when the mechanism is statistical independence or the opposite of the hypothesized effect. We close with

³ Chu et al. (2016) undertake robustness checks using a semiparametric endogenous estimation procedure and cannot reject NQ's parametric specifications, leading them to declare the original findings robust to alternative specifications.

some reflections on the state of empirical understanding of the causes of conflict and the formidable identification challenges researchers still face.

I. Panel IV Methods Without Interactions

We begin by ignoring for the moment the interacted instrument construction behind the HI and NQ papers so as to focus attention on the time series properties of the variables of interest, as those create the spurious regressions problem on which we focus. For the moment, we first construct the IV strategy common to HI and NQ using only the single time series variable before turning to the IV with interactions in the next section. In the simplest form, both HI and NQ estimate a relationship of the following type in its core bilateral relationship:

$$Conflict_{it} = \beta X_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

In NQ, X_{it} is the quantity of US wheat food aid shipped to country i in year t ; in HI, X_{it} is the growth of real GDP in country i from year $t-1$ to year t . In both cases, X_{it} is likely endogenous to conflict, even if one controls for country and year fixed effects or other observable control variables. In the food aid case, US government policy explicitly states that food aid should be sent to countries experiencing active conflict or perceived to be at risk of conflict.⁴ Such a policy likely creates upward bias in the β estimate because any factors that increase the risk of conflict that are observed by the US government but not controlled for in the regression would be positively correlated with both X and conflict. Another hypothesis is that, despite stated policy, less food aid gets delivered to countries at higher risk of conflict because of logistical difficulties or the higher costs of working in conflict locations. In HI and many other papers in the literature on conflict and development (reviewed by Ray and Esteban 2017), β is potentially biased downwards by reverse causality if active conflict dampens economic activity.

So both HI and NQ naturally turn to IV estimation, proposing a variable, Z , that is correlated with X and uncorrelated with conflict except through X . In NQ, Z is lagged (i.e., year $t-1$) total wheat production in the US. In HI, Z is the short term nominal interest rate of the base country to which country i 's exchange rate is most closely tied;⁵ we proxy that with the global real

⁴ USAID states explicitly: “Food for Peace saves lives, reduces suffering and *supports the early recovery of people affected by conflict* and natural disaster emergencies through food assistance” (<https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/bureaus/bureau-democracy-conflict-and-humanitarian-assistance/office-food>, *emphasis added*).

⁵ HI follow Shambaugh (2004) in classifying countries whose currencies are not explicitly pegged to another country's currency via a fixed exchange rate.

interest rate. The instrument Z varies only in the time series dimension, not in the cross-section of countries.⁶ In simplified form, both papers estimate the effect of their endogenous variable on conflict through a two stage least squares (2SLS) procedure consisting of the two regressions:

$$Conflict_{it} = \gamma Z_t + \theta_i + \rho_i t + \mu_{it} \quad (2)$$

$$X_{it} = \pi Z_t + \Theta_i + P_i t + \eta_{it} \quad (3)$$

Equation 3 is first stage, estimating the causal effect of the exogenous instrument, Z , on the endogenous regressor, X . Equation 2 estimates the reduced form relationship between conflict and the instrument, Z . These equations can include controls for countries and a time trend interacted with a dummy variable for the world region of which country i is a member, but since the instrument only varies annually in the time series, they cannot include year fixed effects. The indirect least squares (ILS) IV estimate, the ratio of the reduced form estimate over the first stage coefficient estimate, $\hat{\gamma}/\hat{\pi}$, represents the 2SLS estimate.

a. Ignoring the time series nature of the data


We begin by replicating the NQ (HI) analyses, using the same panel data including 125 (97) non-OECD countries over 36 (34) years, with the binary dependent variable of conflict status, which equals one if a country experienced more than 25 battle deaths in a year, the endogenous regressors of quantity of wheat food aid delivered to country i by the US (year-on-year GDP growth in i), the instruments – lagged US wheat production (global real interest rates) – and a rich set of characteristics of countries and years that the original authors use as controls.⁷ When one looks at simple scatter plots of data, ignoring the temporal sequencing of observations, the panel IV identification strategy seems to work. Figure 1a shows the correlation between real interest rates and conflict, the reduced form relationship in HI. Interest rates and conflict covary positively. Figure 1b shows the negative first stage relationship with the endogenous variable. Since the IV

⁶ In HI, the base country interest rate instrument varies across groups of countries but is still varying only in time series within any given group that shares a common base country currency. Their specification is a bit more complex than the simplified specification we use here, but the core point about spurious regressions still applies.

⁷ The main variables of interest for NQ are taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2010 (conflict), the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) FAOSTAT database (food aid deliveries), and the USDA (wheat production). In replicating both papers, we accessed the NQ replication file included with the publication in the *American Economic Review* (available online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.104.6.1630>) so as to ensure that we used the identical version of these data as NQ. These data are described in further detail in the original NQ paper. Because the HI paper does not include a publicly available replication file, the real interest rate variable is taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2018) and merged into the NQ dataset. We are therefore explicitly not attempting to replicate HI’s numeric estimates, just their procedure.


estimate is just the reduced form divided by the first stage, we know that the ILS/2SLS estimate of GDP growth on conflict, instrumenting for growth with interest rates, will be negative, i.e., that GDP growth is associated with less conflict.

Figure 1a: Conflict and real interest rates *Figure 1b: GDP growth and real interest rates*



Similarly, Figure 2a shows the positive reduced form relationship in NQ, between conflict and lagged US wheat production, while Figure 2b shows the positive first stage relationship between lagged US wheat production and wheat food aid shipments. Since both the first stage and reduced form relationships are positive, the ILS/2SLS estimate of US food aid, instrumented by lagged wheat production, on recipient country conflict is necessarily positive as well, suggesting that food aid is positively associated with (prolonged) conflict.

Figure 2a: Conflict and lagged US wheat production *Figure 2b: Food aid shipments and lagged US wheat production*



b. Exploring the time series nature of the data

The problem with the estimation strategy above is that the sequencing of observations plays no role in the analysis, although the actual data come from a specific time series. One could scramble the time series observations without changing the plots in Figures 1 and 2 and parameter estimates based on the relationships depicted in them at all.

Figure 3 displays the actual trends in the time series, estimated nonparametrically by lowess, in conflict (upper left panel), wheat production (upper right panel), interest rates (lower left panel) and a fourth variable, global audio cassette tape sales (lower right panel). We chose the audio cassettes variable specifically because it is obviously spurious. No coherent, credible mechanism exists that causally links audio cassette tape sales to conflict, real interest rates, or US food aid shipments. Yet simple visual inspection of the data makes it immediately apparent that conflict, US wheat production, and global real interest rates all followed the same inverted-U trend over the sample period as global audio cassette tape sales. One can always find a strong correlation between an obviously spurious variable that follows the same trend, like global audio cassette tape sales.⁸

The simple reduced form estimates in Table 1 confirm what one can immediately infer from visual inspection of the plots of the time series: strongly positive and statistically significant correlations between the dependent variable of interest, conflict, and each of the other three candidate instrumental variables. It does not matter whether the instrumental variable is plausible, like real interest rates or lagged US wheat production, or obviously spurious, like global audio cassette sales. The reduced form is strong and positive regardless. This underscores an important point widely underappreciated in panel IV estimation. If the outcome of interest exhibits a strong trend, then any variable that exhibits a similar (opposing) trend will generate a statistically significant, positive (negative) reduced form relationship, whether or not the instrument is spurious or truly causal. How can we rule out the possibility that plausible instruments like lagged US wheat production or global real interest rates are not spuriously correlated with the outcome of interest just like the clearly spurious instrument, global audio cassette tape sales?

⁸ The global audio cassette sales data come from IFPI (2009).

Figure 3: Underlying trends in the conflict and instrumental variables




Table 1: Reduced form estimates between conflict and candidate instruments

VARIABLES	Dependent variable = incidence of war (of any type)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Global real interest rate	0.01082 (0.00345)		
Lagged US wheat production		0.00245 (0.00076)	
Global music cassette sales			0.08196 (0.02162)
Observations	4,161	4,161	3,964
R ²	0.482	0.481	0.494

Note: all regressions include country fixed effects and year trends interacted with one of six geographic regions defined by the World Bank.

Of course, the relationship we care about is not the reduced form, but rather the relationship between the outcome (conflict) and the potentially endogenous explanatory variable (shipments of food aid or GDP growth). A reduced form relationship between an outcome and an instrument is only one criteria to check in determining the validity of the IV strategy. The other is the first stage correlation to validate the relevance of the instrument. We know from Figures 1 and 2 that real interest rates are associated with GDP growth and that lagged US wheat production is correlated with food aid shipments. But in those figures, time played no role. Figure 4 displays the trends in the endogenous regressors of interest: wheat aid in panel 4a and GDP growth in panel 4b. Both variables also show a strong trend, inverted-U in the case of wheat food aid shipments, just like the outcome variable and candidate instruments displayed in Figure 3, and U shaped in the case of real GDP growth, counter-cyclical to the plots previously displayed.

Figure 4a: US wheat food aid shipments





Figure 4b: GDP growth rates



Given that our candidate instruments all have inverted-U trends, Figures 3 and 4 tell us what we already knew from Figures 1 and 2, that interest rates will be negatively correlated with GDP growth and that lagged US wheat production will be positively correlated food aid shipments in a given year. It is less obvious, however, at least until one compares multiple variables' trends, that any of several candidate instruments and variables with common or mirror-image trends can generate significant panel IV estimates of the relationship of interest, whether or not the instruments are spurious.⁹ A common trend among the dependent, endogenous explanatory, and

⁹ We use HI and NQ precisely so as to illustrate this in the case of both common and opposite cycles.

instrumental variables means that spurious and truly causal relationships will exhibit identical patterns, calling into question the causal identification.

Table 2 below reinforces this concern, demonstrating that co-trending instruments serve as strong substitutes for one another. Instrumenting for GDP growth or US food aid shipments with any of the three candidate instruments – global real interest rates, lagged US wheat production, or global audio cassette sales – yields remarkably similar coefficient estimates that are always highly statistically significant. Indeed, for the food aid regressor NQ study, the most precisely 2SLS estimate comes from using the audio cassette tape sales instrument that is most obviously spurious. The multiple candidate instruments raise a concern that some omitted cyclical variable – the rise and fall of Reagan-Thatcher policies? El Nino Southern Oscillation climate cycles? – accounts for the observed correlations.¹⁰

Table 2: Co-trending instruments as substitutes for one another

IV =	Dependent variable = incidence of war (of any type)					
Endogenous regressor	(1): R	(2): W	(3): C	(4): R	(5): W	(6): C
GDP growth	-2.97560 (1.07478)	-3.12900 (1.27973)	-3.49071 (1.10815)			
US food aid (tons)				0.00844 (0.00834)	0.00506 (0.00332)	0.00848 (0.00309)
Observations	4,015	4,015	3,917	4,161	4,161	3,964

Note: Column headers indicate the instrument used. R= real interest rates, W = lagged US wheat production, C = cassette tape sales

The existence of multiple candidate instruments, at least some of which are almost surely spurious, in no way negates the possibility of a truly causal relationship between the endogenous regressor and a suitable instrument. But the process serves as a caution that spurious regressions are quite possible by showing that the time series pattern in the spurious variable drives the correlation. The risk of erroneously accepting a spurious correlation is especially high because, as we show in the next section, traditional inference will over-reject the no-impact null in the presence of co-trending variables and will almost surely lead to biased 2SLS estimates in panel IV

¹⁰ This table also raises a publication bias concern. One could imagine constructing an IV strategy using global real interest rates to instrument for food aid deliveries. The standard IV analysis would suggest that interest rates have a strong first stage.

regressions. As we will go on to explain, the possibility of spuriously correlated trends makes it essential that researchers have in mind a specific, credible mechanism that relates the instrument they choose to the endogenous regressor, and that they subject that hypothesized mechanism to explicit testing. In section III we illustrate how one might do that, with reference to the celebrated NQ paper, which articulates a specific mechanism relating lagged US wheat production to US food aid shipments.

c. How correlated cycles affect panel IV inference: A Monte Carlo analysis

The previous section demonstrates the possibility of spurious correlation in the time series, but that possibility in no way establishes that the HI or NQ results are wrong. In finite samples, one can always find a spurious variable that is highly correlated with the outcome variable. The fact that global audio cassette sales are correlated with conflict does not mean that more food aid or slower GDP growth do not cause conflict. Rather, it hints at the challenges to making valid inference that arise from spurious correlation in time series variables, which we now explore in more depth.

In this sub-section we use Monte Carlo simulation to investigate how autocorrelation in time series variables can cause both mistaken inference and bias. We draw on the time series literature dating back at least to Yule (1926), Slutsky (1937), Granger and Newbold (1974), Phillips (1986), Phillips and Hansen (1990), and Phillips (1998), all of whom found correlated errors can cause standard inference tests to suggest spurious statistical significance. We build directly on those insights.

We begin by simulating an instrument that follows a random walk process. Specifically, in each round we implement the following procedure, mimicking the NQ study except that we replace lagged US wheat production, their instrument, with a manufactured random variable that explicitly follows a nonstationary, random walk process:

1. Define an instrumental variable Z_t that takes a value of 100 in year -36.¹¹
2. In each subsequent year, there is a random shock that is uniformly distributed, $e_t \sim U(-0.5, 0.5)$. In year t , $Z_t = Z_{t-1} + e_t$. Therefore, any given year Z 's expected value,

¹¹ We use 36 periods simply to replicate the duration of the sample used in estimation. This is inherently arbitrary. We just wanted to start with a deterministic expected value and have generated random sequences of the time series value from a known expected value.

$E[Z_t]=100$, but the realized value, Z_t , will fall above or below its expected value based on the prior sequence of innovations in e_t . From year 1 onward, Z_t follows a random walk.

3. In years 1-36, holding conflict, food aid flows, and all of NQ's controls from their baseline specification constant, we estimate the first stage, reduced form, and 2SLS equations from NQ, substituting the Z_t variable described above as the instrument for food aid rather than lagged US wheat production. Everything else stays exactly the same as in NQ.
4. Repeat steps 1-3 1,000 times, saving the coefficient estimates on Z_t , the associated p-values and KP F-statistics for weak instrument tests in the first stage, reduced form, and 2SLS equations.

The upper left panel of Figure 5a plots the distribution of the π^{sim} coefficients estimated in each of 1000 replications of the following first stage regression (suppressing included controls):

$$Aid_{it} = \pi^{sim} Z_{it} + \eta_{it}^{sim} \quad (4)$$

In expectation, Z_t is uncorrelated with Aid_{it} , i.e., $E(\pi^{sim})=0$. But the distribution exhibits a multimodal pattern first reported by Yule (1926).¹² While the mean of π across simulated draws of the data set indeed equals zero, the mode diverges *away* from the expectation, so that extreme values arise more often than values close to the true population parameter, zero. This problem is an example of what Yule called “nonsense correlations” and later became known as spurious regressions. In his original examples, Yule found that the problem arises whenever one regresses two variables that can be described by harmonic functions over time. Two sine waves with different periods are uncorrelated over a sufficiently long period, but may be highly correlated if, for example, the window of observation only includes a segment where both sine waves are on the downward sloping part of their cycle. This is thus a small sample problem in limited time series.


The practical importance of this fact became clear when Slutsky (1937) demonstrated why a surprising number of economic and physical phenomena could be effectively modeled in short periods by harmonic functions.¹³ He showed that common cycles arise with perhaps-surprising

¹² Yule's (1926) empirical finding remains a subject of analytical research in statistics. Ernst et al. (2017) recently proved the result that the distribution of estimated correlation coefficients between two independent time series will be heavily dispersed. There do not yet appear to be analytical results for the panel data or instrumental variables estimation cases, however. The empirical simulation methods we use appear to remain the state of the art currently.

¹³ Or as Slutsky (1937, p.105) more eloquently put it “Almost all of the phenomena of economic life, like many other processes, social, meteorological, and others, occur in sequences of rising and falling movements, like waves. Just as

regularity in economic variables because as variables accumulate a past history of random shocks, the sum of random shocks can always be modeled to a maximum degree of prediction error as a cyclical sequence. A robust literature in time series econometrics, especially since Granger and Newbold (1974), recognizes the spurious regression problems that arise when regressing one variable that follows a random walk on another that also follows a random walk. Hence the standard practice in time series applications to test for difference and trend stationarity in variables on both sides of a regression before estimating correlations between them. In the next section, we apply these conventional time series tests to the NQ and HI variables. But first we show what this problem means in an IV setup with both a first stage and second stage equation rather than simply a single regression equation. We show that in the IV estimation setting, the problem moves beyond mistaken inference due to over-rejection of the null hypothesis to one of bias and inconsistency. Appendix 1 shows this more formally and generally.

*Figure 5: Monte Carlo exploration of panel IV estimation with positively co-trending variables
 5a: first stage parameter estimate distribution 5b: reduced form parameter estimate distribution*



waves following each other on the sea do not repeat each other perfectly, so economic cycles never repeat earlier ones exactly either in duration or in amplitude. Nevertheless in both cases, it is almost always possible to detect, even in the multitude of individual peculiarities of the phenomena, marks of certain approximate uniformities and regularities.”

5c: 2SLS coefficient estimate distribution

5d: plot of reduced form and first stage estimates




Figure 5b shows the distribution of coefficient estimates from the reduced form equation (again suppressing controls included in the simulations):

$$Conflict_{it} = \gamma^{sim} Z_{it} + \mu_{it}^{sim} \quad (5)$$


Not surprisingly, since we already know that the conflict variable cycles too, this distribution also exhibits Yule’s “nonsense correlation” problem. The mass of estimated coefficients occurs *away* from zero, even though the coefficient estimate converges to zero in expectation. Conventional significance tests of the reduced form will also understate the p-value of the estimated relationship.

Note that the Yule-Slutsky spurious regressions problem in either the first stage or the reduced form regressions is one of inference, not bias. The estimated $\widehat{\pi^{sim}}$ ’s in Figure 5a and $\widehat{\gamma^{sim}}$ ’s in Figure 5b center around zero, confirming the unbiasedness and consistency of the parameter estimate. With a sufficient number of 36 year samples, $\text{plim}(\widehat{\pi^{sim}}) \rightarrow 0$ in both cases. When focusing only on one or the other equation, the issue is that standard inference tests are based on the assumption that π^{sim} has a unimodal (typically, normal) distribution. Conventionally computed p-values will therefore understate the probability that $\widehat{\pi^{sim}}$ or $\widehat{\gamma^{sim}}$ is at least as far from the zero null value as the observed value when the actual sampling distribution is multi-modal, thereby artificially inflating the estimated statistical confidence that a relevant relationship exists. We may take small comfort then from the fact that if we collect enough data, we will eventually get the right answer, even if the convergence might take a bit longer than conventional tests suggest.¹⁴

¹⁴ The concern about convergence is not a negligible worry. As Yule (1926, pp. 12-13) put it “Be it remembered, we have taken a fairly long sample [to establish the independence of two cycling variables]... if the complete period were something exceeding, say, 500 years, it is seldom that we would have such a sample at our disposal.” In other words,


The greater concern is that the consistency and unbiasedness that holds for the OLS estimate estimated in the first stage or in the reduced form equation do not hold for the 2SLS/ILS estimate. The empirical distribution of the 2SLS estimate, shown in Figure 5c, is clearly positively biased and not centered around zero, which is implicitly what applied researchers seem to assume would be the case if instruments are irrelevant. The reason is evident in Figure 5d. The first stage and reduced form estimates from the same regression are positively correlated. This occurs, quite predictably, because the conflict and food aid variables follow the same inverted-U cycles. This positive correlation in trends generates positive bias in the IV estimate of interest, arising purely due to the spurious regressions problem.

Figure 6: Monte Carlo exploration of panel IV estimation with negatively co-trending variables
6a: first stage parameter estimate distribution 6b: reduced form parameter estimate distribution



if a cycling variable only finishes its cycle once every 500 years, we may need 500 years of data to reveal the true association with another cycling variable. To make this situation worse, if the cycling is a result of random processes as described by Slutsky (1937), the length of time needed to “finish a cycle” may not be known, because it does not result from any model other than the structure of the unobserved error process. See Appendix 1 for a more detailed exploration of this issue.

6c: 2SLS coefficient estimate distribution



6d: plot of reduced form and first stage estimates




Figure 6 repeats the exercise, now using GDP growth rather than food aid as the endogenous X variable, following HI. The distribution of reduced form coefficient estimates in Figure 6a again shows the now-expected bimodal pattern with a disproportionate incidence of coefficient estimates farther from zero than near zero. The distribution of first stage coefficient estimates from regressing GDP growth on the spuriously generated random walk variables shows this same bimodal pattern of spurious correlation in Figure 6b that we saw in Figure 5b.

The difference between the NQ (food aid) and HI (GDP growth) models is apparent in the bottom two panels of Figures 5 and 6. In Figure 5c (6c) we find that the Monte Carlo analog to the NQ (HI) estimates are positively (negatively) biased and the reduced form and first stage coefficient estimates are positively (negatively) correlated in the case where the endogenous regressor and outcome variable co-trend (counter-)cyclically.

If both $\widehat{\gamma}^{sim}$ and $\widehat{\pi}^{sim}$ are estimated by nonsense correlations, and the two may be correlated, as we saw in Figures 5 and 6, can we trust the 2SLS IV estimate truly identifies the causal effect of the endogenous regressor? Clearly not. Although $\text{plim}(\widehat{\pi}^{sim}) \rightarrow 0$ and $\text{plim}(\widehat{\gamma}^{sim}) \rightarrow 0$ in large enough samples, $\text{plim}(\widehat{\gamma}^{sim} / \widehat{\pi}^{sim}) \rightarrow \omega \neq 0$ unless $\widehat{\pi}^{sim}$ and $\widehat{\gamma}^{sim}$ are uncorrelated. This will not be true without meeting several stringent conditions, as we explain in detail in Appendix 1. But the intuition is reasonably straightforward. Because spurious regression of the time series means that they are almost surely correlated, the ILS/2SLS estimator is almost surely biased and inconsistent. Just as one will over-reject both nulls $H_0: \pi^{sim}=0$ and $H_0: \gamma^{sim}=0$ using traditional significance tests, so too will one over-reject the null $H_0: \gamma^{sim} / \pi^{sim} = 0$ by conventional testing methods. Clearly, the time series component of the underlying variables matters enormously, even though it is typically ignored in panel IV estimation. The relevance of the

instrument can be readily satisfied by spurious regressions or “nonsense” correlations. Indeed, over enough iterations, spurious regression theory implies that randomly generated nonstationary instruments inevitably appear “relevant” (Phillips and Hansen 1990).

Of course, $\text{plim}(\widehat{\gamma}^{sim}/\widehat{\pi}^{sim}) \rightarrow \omega \neq 0$ could arise because there truly exists a causal relationship between the endogenous regressor and the outcome of interest. But the prospect of spurious regression raises a serious concern that it might arise instead because the two are cointegrated and thus trivially correlated, or they are uncorrelated in expectation, but spuriously correlated in the finite sample. The process we outline below aims at testing these latter two possibilities so that the only remaining option is a true causal relationship.

d. Addressing the common cycles problem

To see how cointegration could lead to a spurious non-zero association through panel IV estimation, imagine a very simple model where conflict follows a random walk and food aid – NQ’s endogenous explanatory variable – in period t is exactly determined as a linear function of conflict in period $t-1$, reflecting the original concern of reverse causality that arises if the US government follows its stated policy of directing food aid to places experiencing conflict. Then a fully exogenous conflict process would follow the law of motion

$$c_{it} = c_{it-1} + v_{it} \quad (6)$$

with $E[\epsilon_{it}] = 0$ and $E[\text{cov}(c_{it-1}, \epsilon_{it})] = 0$. The reverse causal relationship between conflict and aid can be modeled by

$$a_{it} = \phi c_{it-1}. \quad (7)$$

Taking any instrument Z_t and forming the reduced form and first stage regressions,

$$c_{it} = \gamma^{rw} Z_t + \mu_{it}^{rw} \quad (8)$$

$$a_{it} = \pi^{rw} Z_t + \eta_{it}^{rw} \quad (9)$$

Substituting (6) into (8) and (7) into (9), the 2SLS estimate of the effect of aid on conflict using Z as the instrument is (suppressing the country subscripts):

$$\frac{\widehat{\gamma}^{rw}}{\widehat{\pi}^{rw}} = \frac{c \partial v(c_{t-1}, Z_t)}{\phi c \partial v(c_{t-1}, Z_t)} + \frac{c \partial v(v_{it}, Z_t)}{\phi c \partial v(c_{t-1}, Z_t)}. \quad (10)$$

When $\text{cov}(c_{t-1}, Z_t) \neq 0$, as is likely to arise given the risk of spurious correlation when estimating a linear regression of a variable that follows a random walk on another random variable, as we established in the preceding section – following Yule(1926), Slutsky (1937), Granger and

Newbold (1974) and Phillips and Hansen (1990) – then the 2SLS estimator will converge to $\frac{1}{\phi}$. This means that the ILS/2SLS estimator will be biased in the direction of the correlation between conflict and food aid allocations.

The irony here is significant. The IV estimator meant to remove the possible reverse causality in the endogenous regressor converges on the inverse of the reverse causality partial correlation parameter, i.e., it is biased in the direction of the OLS bias one sought to remove. This bias arises because of the mechanical cointegration of c_{it} and a_{it} ; c_{it} is integrated of order I(1), but $c_{it} - \frac{1}{\phi} a_{it}$ is necessarily integrated of order I(0). Spurious correlation between c_{it} and Z_t arises from the nonstationarity of c_{it} , and because a_{it} is a linear combination of c_{it} , a_{it} inherits the same spurious correlation. The fact that $E[\text{cov}(Z_t, c_{it})] = 0$, does not imply that $E[\frac{\widehat{\gamma}^{rw}}{\widehat{\pi}^{rw}}] = 0$ nor $\text{plim}(\widehat{\gamma}^{rw} / \widehat{\pi}^{rw}) \rightarrow 0$, because $\widehat{\text{cov}}(c_{t-1}, z_t)$ typically is not zero in finite samples.

Despite its fidelity to the stated policy underpinning US food aid shipments, this simple model is not necessarily more plausible than the alternative that NQ hypothesize. This exercise merely illustrates that significant correlations with the instrument in both the reduced form and first stage regressions in no way guarantee that the ILS/2SLS estimate represents a causal estimate of the effect of the endogenous regressor on the outcome variable, even when instrument is genuinely excludable from the conflict regression in a sufficiently long time series, as is true in this simple example. If the conflict time series is nonstationary, as seems true on average in Figure 3 (and in more formal tests below), then the reduced form association could well be spurious. When spurious time series correlation is a concern, even if the instrument, Z_t , meets the exclusion restriction and both the reduced form and first stage regressions yield statistically significant coefficient estimates, there could nonetheless be no causal effect of X on conflict.

The fundamental issue with inference and identification in panel IV estimation is the strong assumption of iid errors, which may not be appropriate if realizations of either the outcome variable or the endogenous X variable depend on past realizations. A common strategy to address this concern is to control for past realizations in the regression equations. For example, NQ report a robustness check where they add past realizations of conflict as controls. The two equations of the 2SLS framework then become (suppressing controls):

$$\text{Conflict}_{it} = \gamma_1^{ldv} \text{Wheat}_{t-1} + \gamma_2 \text{Conflict}_{it-1} + \mu_{it} \quad (11)$$

$$\text{Aid}_{it} = \pi_1^{ldv} \text{Wheat}_{t-1} + \pi_2 \text{Conflict}_{it-1} + \eta_{it} \quad (12)$$


This specification allows for correlation between conflict in periods t and $t-1$. If US wheat production (*Wheat*) is exogenous and iid over years and conflict is iid over time conditional on the previous year's conflict, then this obviates the spurious regression problem in the reduced form regression of conflict on US wheat production. But the reduced form equation is only one part of the 2SLS framework. If aid flows are also nonstationary, as appears true in Figure 4a (and formal tests corroborate below), then the first stage regression of aid on conflict still risks the spurious regression problem.

In order to explore the effects of trying to control for prospective serial correlation in the outcome or endogenous explanatory variable, we expand the Monte Carlo simulation described above to include three additional specifications:

- (i) LDV: We control for the lagged value of the dependent variable (*Conflict*) and generate the ILS/2SLS estimates, as before;
- (ii) LIV: We control for the lagged value of the independent variable (*Aid*) and generate the ILS/2SLS estimates, as before;
- (iii) 1st Diff: we take first differences of all variables (*Conflict*, *Aid*, and *Wheat*) and generate the ILS/2SLS estimates, as before. Note that because the manufactured, spurious instrumental variable follows an I(1) random walk process, first differencing will necessarily generate an iid process. This will not be true more generally, when one does not know the true nature of the nonstationary process the variable follows.

For each simulation, we plot the distribution of $\gamma_1^{ldv}/\pi_1^{ldv}$ parameter estimate for 1,000 draws of the simulation along with the distribution from the baseline specification as above. As is evident in Figure 7, controlling for only the LDV or the LIV does not eliminate the bias from spurious regressions. The distributions of $\gamma_1^{ldv}/\pi_1^{ldv}$ when controlling for the lagged LDV or lagged LIV are both centered above zero. This is unsurprising since the LDV and LIV specifications only render errors iid when they exactly match the underlying time series process of the variables, an unlikely event. The standard error of the distribution is smaller for the LDV case than for the baseline, meaning that depending on the relative reduction in error or mean bias, including the lagged LDV could actually increase the odds that one mistakenly reports a statistically significant non-zero relationship due to the use of a spurious instrument.

Figure 7: Distributions of 2SLS parameter estimates



As reflected in Figure 7, the only specification that does not on average return an estimated positive effect of aid on conflict is the first differences regressions that exactly corrects for the known I(1) process of the manufactured instrument (controls again suppressed):

$$\Delta Conflict_{it} = \gamma_1^{diff} \Delta Z_t + \mu_{it}^{diff} \quad (13)$$

$$\Delta Aid_{it} = \pi_1^{diff} \Delta Z_t + \eta_{it}^{diff} \quad (14)$$

This works because it directly corrects for the known underlying nonstationarity of the time series variables.

Given this finding, we implement the NQ 2SLS estimation strategy to estimate the coefficient of aid on conflict – in an uninteracted model not yet accounting for shift-shares – taking first differences across years as in equations (13)-(14). The resulting coefficient estimates reported in Table 3 are similar in magnitude to those originally reported by NQ, but in the opposite direction – i.e., suggesting a negative effect of aid on conflict – and statistically insignificant. Correcting for prospective nonstationarity in the time series completely overturns NQ’s headline result.

Table 3: First-differenced 2SLS coefficients of food on conflict

VARIABLES	Dummy for war in year t - dummy for war in year (t-1)	Dummy for war in year t - dummy for war in year (t-1)	Dummy for war in year t - dummy for war in year (t-1)	Dummy for war in year t - dummy for war in year (t-1)	Dummy for war in year t - dummy for war in year (t-1)	Dummy for intrastate war in year t - dummy for war in year (t-1)	Dummy for interstate war in year t - dummy for war in year (t-1)
ΔAid_t	-0.00802 -0.01317	-0.01155 -0.02421	-0.00832 -0.01467	-0.00726 -0.00938	-0.06586 -0.49312	-0.07786 -0.58185	-0.01625 -0.11351
Controls (for all panels):							
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region-year linear trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
US real per capita GDP							
× avg. prob. of any US food aid	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
US democratic president							
× avg. prob. of any US food aid	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Oil price × avg. prob. of any US food aid	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Monthly recipient temperature and precipitation	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Monthly weather × avg. prob. of any US food aid	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Avg. US military aid × year FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Avg. US economic aid (net of food aid) × year FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Avg. recipient cereal imports × year FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Avg. recipient cereal production × year FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table replicates the 2SLS estimates from Table 2 in NQ, using the same set of controls as NQ and clustering at the country level as in NQ. The change from NQ involves replacing the level values of food aid, conflict and wheat production with first differenced values. For example, ΔAid_t is the quantity of wheat food aid delivered (in metric tons, MT) in year t minus the quantity delivered in year t-1. The instrument for the 2SLS estimate of the effect of ΔAid_t is $\Delta wheat_{t-1}$, where $\Delta wheat_{t-1}$ is the quantity of wheat produced in the US (in 100,000 MT) in year t-1 minus the quantity of wheat produced in year t-2.

Table 4 replicates this exercise for the HI 2SLS estimation of the effect of GDP growth on conflict. The coefficient estimate on GDP growth is likewise not statistically significant in any specification and both the magnitude and sign of the estimates vary considerably depending on the choice of controls one includes. These headline results likewise disappear with correction for nonstationary time series.

Table 4: First-differenced 2SLS coefficients of food on conflict

VARIABLES	Dummy for war in year t - dummy for war in year (t-1)	Dummy for war in year t - dummy for war in year (t-1)	Dummy for war in year t - dummy for war in year (t-1)	Dummy for war in year t - dummy for war in year (t-1)	Dummy for war in year t - dummy for war in year (t-1)	Dummy for intrastate war in year t - dummy for war in year (t-1)	Dummy for interstate war in year t - dummy for war in year (t-1)
$\Delta \text{Ln}(\text{GDP})_t$	-13.02698	27.29817	-663.5553	-5.493698	5.035685	-4.358483	5.630787
	52.06428	179.9781	-.0014869	8.914968	5.492107	5.085462	5.105335
Controls (for all panels):							
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region-year linear trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
US real per capita GDP							
× avg. prob. of any US food aid	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
US democratic president							
× avg. prob. of any US food aid	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Oil price × avg. prob.							
of any US food aid	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Monthly recipient temperature							
and precipitation	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Monthly weather × avg. prob.							
of any US food aid	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Avg. US military aid × year FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Avg. US economic aid							
(net of food aid) × year FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Avg. recipient cereal imports							
× year FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Avg. recipient cereal							
production							
× year FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table replicates 2SLS estimates of the effect of GDP growth on conflict using the HI approach of instrumenting for GDP growth with real interest rates, but with both conflict and real interest rates first differenced over time so that the instrument is real interest rates in year t minus real interest rates in year t-1. To make the table comparable to table 3, we use the same specifications and controls as in the NQ table. $\Delta \text{Ln}(\text{GDP})_t$ is the growth rate in GDP, measured as the natural log of GDP in year t minus the natural log of GDP in year t-1.

The clear takeaway from this section is that panel IV estimation that assumes iid error terms and ignores the temporal sequencing of observations runs a serious risk of spurious regressions given the high likelihood of co-trending variables. In the single equation case familiar from time series econometrics, the (reduced form or first stage) parameter estimates remain consistent, but classical inference tests overstate rejection rates on account of the multi-modal distribution of the

parameter estimates. But in the case of IV estimation, the likely correlation between the reduced form and first stage regression estimates leads to bias and inconsistency. Ironically, in the case where reverse causality is a concern, the direction of bias in the IV estimate will match the sign of the reverse causal correlation between the dependent variable and the endogenous regressor, which the IV estimation was meant to overcome. Cycles of unknown periodicity make it difficult to control for trends effectively using lagged dependent or independent variables as controls. Corrections for trend or difference stationarity based on formal tests to identify the order of integration may work somewhat better, but precisely identifying the underlying time series process is a bit of a blunt instrument.

II. Panel IV Methods With Interacted Instruments

The possibility remains, however, that a true causal relation really underlies the observed correlations reported in HI, NQ, and other papers that rely on identification by panel IV methods. HI and NQ – and many other authors – rely on shift-share (i.e., Bartik) or similar interacted instruments to try to identify a causal effect of an endogenous explanatory variable of interest. In this section we show that although interacting the Z_t time series instrumental variable with another variable that varies only in the cross-section buys some added flexibility in accommodating time trends, the interaction does not ameliorate the spurious regressions problem.

The intuition behind the shift-share instrument is that there may be a common time trend to conflict that could be correlated with a common time trend in food aid flows or real GDP growth. If all countries share this trend, then comparing differences in countries that are differentially affected by the instrument allows researchers to control for the common cycle, just as in more familiar difference-in-differences (DD) estimation. In practice, this strategy is implemented by estimating variants of the two following equations:

$$Conflict_{it} = \gamma^{int} Z_t * D_i + \theta_i^{int} + t_t + \mu_{it}^{int} \quad (15)$$

$$X_{it} = \pi^{int} Z_t * D_i + \Theta_i^{int} + T_t + \eta_{it}^{int} \quad (16)$$

Implementing such a strategy requires selecting a variable, D_i , that varies in the cross-section to interact with the exogenous time series variable. NQ use the regularity of food aid receipts, defined as the proportion of the 36 years in their sample data in which country i received any food aid from the US. HI use three different variables for each country i : whether it used a fixed

exchange rate, a measure of the openness of the country's capital account to financial flows, and a measure of ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization to measure within-country sociocultural diversity.

Relative to the uninteracted equations (Equations 2 and 3), this specification introduces two important changes. First, the interaction allows for the possibility of differential exposure to the effect of interest, as the transmission of the time series innovation in Z_t is mediated by the cross-sectional exposure variable, D_i . When D_i is a dummy variable, like an indicator for a country operating a fixed exchange rate regime, this functions like a standard DD estimator. When D_i is continuous this resembles a dose-response estimator.


Second, the instrument is interacted in both the reduced form equation (15) and the first stage equation (16). This allows for more flexible, nonparametric accommodation of unknown common trends, where t_t and T_t are a dummy variables indicating the year instead of the linear time trend t included in equations 2 and 3 with the uninteracted instrument.

Unfortunately, the interaction term and control for the flexible time trend do not resolve the time series issue above. This strategy only allows the researcher to control for time trends that are *common* to the countries of the various types described by the continuum of variation in the variable D . As described in detail by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al (2018), and developed in Appendix 1, this is a stronger caveat than it may seem. If D does not satisfy the exclusion restriction of being uncorrelated with conflict except through its effect on the endogenous regressor and is defined on the unit interval ($D_i \in [0,1]$), as is true of Bartik/shift-share interactions, then the interaction only adds power and does not help with causal identification. Relative to the NQ and HI cases, if the problematic trend in conflict only appears (or appears more strongly) in countries that both experience conflict and more regularly received food aid or exhibit less ethnolinguistic fractionalization, then adding the flexible time trend does not remove the endogeneity. Below we describe how this problem arises and can be diagnosed in the NQ case.

The simplest way to see how the interaction strategy arises in the NQ setup is to plot the temporal variation of the key NQ variables and separate these trends on the same dimension as the interaction strategy. Figures 8A and 8B show the first stage intuition of the policy mechanism that motivates the NQ identification strategy. When lagged US wheat output is high, US government grain purchases lead to accumulation of stocks that get distributed the next year as food aid. Figure 8c visualizes the NQ shift-share identification strategy, showing that food aid flows to the most

regular quartile of recipient countries indeed tracks lagged US wheat output and US government wheat stocks reasonably well. The inverse-U trend that clearly appears among the most frequent aid recipients is not present among the infrequent recipients. Replicating this exercise for the conflict variable in Figure 8D reveals a similar pattern in conflict. Regular food aid recipients have a strong inverse-U trend in conflict that does not appear among the least frequent recipients.


Figure 8: Time trends in the NQ variables



To demonstrate how the interaction influences identification, we introduce the interaction term into the Monte Carlo simulation setup used in section I to show that the bias and inference issues that arise from spurious trends in the uninteracted case remain with the shift-share interacted IV method. Figure 9 shows the estimated 2SLS coefficients of food aid on conflict from 1,000 simulations using the same spurious instrument with a random walk as before. Controlling for the flexible time trend does not remove the bias, because the distribution of coefficients in the interacted case is still centered above zero; they are merely rescaled by the interaction variable. Just as in the uninteracted case, using a spurious, non-stationary time series variable in expectation

returns a positive and statistically significant estimated effect of food aid on conflict. Importantly, this effect is identified only via a common cyclical trend in both aid and conflict that is not shared by both regular and irregular recipients of aid. This result arises even with an exogenous D_i variable.

Figure 9: Simulated distribution of 2SLS estimates using shift-share instrument



As before, a causal effect of aid on conflict is one possible explanation for this association, but it could equally be spurious. Using a panel IV approach in no way ensures causality because of the spurious regression problem. Statistical power differs across the two samples, with a tighter distribution of coefficients in the interacted case than the uninteracted case, as Goldsmith-Pinkham (2018) describe can occur. This arises in the NQ case – and in Bartik instruments more generally – because the D_i term is defined on the $[0,1]$ interval. Rescaling towards zero without removing bias necessarily concentrates the sampling distribution of the parameter estimates. Of course, that can make spurious regression of the no-impact null hypothesis even more likely.


In the simulations of the uninteracted models, we showed that taking first differences of the dependent variable, the instrument, and the endogenous regressor works to correct for a known- $I(1)$ instrument. We re-estimate the interacted and uninteracted models in our 1,000 simulations

now using the first differenced variables.¹⁵ Figure 10 shows the distribution of estimated 2SLS coefficients of food aid on conflict. As was true in the uninteracted case, first differencing to remove spurious correlation in time series indeed eliminates the bias. Once one renders the errors iid, bias and inconsistency are gone. And because the interaction term now rescales without a bias constraint, it has no effect on the power of the estimator.

The take-away message of this section is simple: the interacted instrument does not solve the spurious regressions problem that easily arises in the time series component of a panel, regardless of whether it satisfies the standard criteria for instrumental variables. Interacting the instrument that varies in time series with another variable that varies in cross-section merely rescales the ILS/2SLS estimates from the uninteracted regression specifications. If the interaction term is in the unit interval, it thereby increases the statistical power of a biased estimator but does not remove the bias, which can exaggerate the risk of over-rejection of the null.

Figure 10: 2SLS estimates using shift-share instrument and first-differenced variables

¹⁵ For the interacted models, the specification is:
 $\Delta Conflict_{it} = \gamma^{intdiff} \Delta Z_t * D_i + t_t^{intdiff} + \mu_{it}^{intdiff}$ for the reduced form and
 $\Delta X_{it} = \pi^{intdiff} \Delta Z_t * D_i + T_t^{intdiff} + \eta_{it}^{intdiff}$ for the first stage



One corrects the bias only by correcting for the spurious correlation arising in the time series – in our example, by first differencing $I(1)$ variables where the instrument is known to follow an $I(1)$ random walk process. And then the interaction adds no statistical power to the uninteracted regressions. But it does retain the other advantages of the interacted instrument design: more flexible accommodation of common trends and more nuanced interpretation of the coefficient estimates in a manner consistent with DD or dose-response estimators.

III. Seven practical diagnostic steps for panel IV estimation

The preceding cautions notwithstanding, in some cases panel IV estimation may still present the best option for attempting causal identification of a relationship of interest. But one must address several systematic concerns so as to increase confidence that panel IV results indeed yield unbiased estimates and to avoid the mistaken inference and bias that arise due to spurious regressions. Toward that end, we briefly outline seven practical steps one might take to try to systematically rule out the spurious regressions (and other) problems. Some will seem painfully obvious. Yet we observe that many published papers omit, and seem to fall prey to, these simple diagnostics. We number the steps merely as a means of differentiating them, not to imply a

necessary sequencing of steps. We illustrate this with application to the celebrated NQ paper, with details found in Appendix 2.

Step 1: Carefully visually inspect the data

The first step in any empirical study should be to visually inspect the data for patterns. In the panel IV case, one needs to look not only at the scatter plots, which implicitly treat observations as iid, but also at the underlying time series in the outcome variable, the endogenous regressor(s), and the candidate instrument(s). Figures 1, 2, and 8 illustrate this. Recognizing that in the presence of cycles of unknown periodicity, one is in effect identifying off of clusters of sequenced observations, there is also merit in looking at trends in sub-periods of the sample. This can help pin down the source(s) of variation used to identify the relationship of interest. In the NQ case, as we illustrate in Appendix 2, plotting simple trends at decadal scale in the sample shows that identification comes from a positive association between lagged wheat production and conflict that only differs significantly between regular and irregular recipients in the 1970s. When identification comes from a specific sub-period in the data, the analyst might usefully reflect on both (i) the representativeness of that sub-period for the broader inferences being made, and (ii) prospective confounders that might generate spurious correlation during that sub-period alone or a true causal mechanism that existed only during that sub-period.

Step 2: Run OLS regression, identify most likely direction of bias, then interrogate 2SLS estimates

One should always start regression analysis with simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Then carefully think through the mechanism(s) by which non-random selection, reverse causality, or some other form of statistical endogeneity would bias the OLS coefficient estimate(s). What direction of bias does this suggest in the OLS estimates?

To address the prospective bias in the OLS estimates, one will naturally attempt IV estimation. But it is essential to think carefully about two things. First, in the case of interacted IVs, does the cross-sectional component satisfy the exclusion restriction, or might it be endogenous, in particular vulnerable to reverse causality? More generally, one needs to compare the resulting 2SLS estimates with the previous OLS estimates in order to assess whether the resulting change in the coefficient estimate of interest is consistent with a plausible mechanism that would bias the OLS estimate. If the IV estimate moves in a direction other than what one

anticipated, that should serve as a caution. Perhaps one's understanding of the source(s) of bias in the OLS regression was flawed, and some other, countervailing mechanism overpowers the source of bias originally hypothesized. That explanation suggests a need to study the underlying mechanisms more carefully to establish whether such a countervailing mechanism is plausible. Alternatively, the IV results are spurious. As we demonstrated above in the case of reverse causality, the IV estimates biased by spurious regressions will move in the wrong direction relative to the OLS estimates.

NQ find a negative but statistically insignificant OLS association between US food aid shipments and conflict in recipient countries. NQ justifiably worry that this relationship could be biased, however, because food aid deliveries may be endogenous to conflict incidence. Since stated US government policy directs food aid flows to conflict affected countries, the bias in the OLS estimates should be upward. The fact that US food aid flows disproportionately to food aid affected countries is easily corroborated in the data. The fact that the 2SLS estimates increase relative to the OLS ones suggests either spurious regressions, or an odd, rather implausible negative selection mechanism wherein logistical, safety and other concerns about shipping food aid to conflict-affected countries overrides published policy. No evidence is provided to support the claim of negative selection. Furthermore, as we show in Appendix 2, there is strong reason to believe that the shift-share instrument they use is endogenous, with reverse causality between the dependent variable and endogenous regressor leading to spurious regression bias in the 2SLS estimates that reinforces, rather than corrects for, the OLS bias, following precisely the mechanism we modeled in section I.

Step 3: Identify causal mechanism(s) and instrument(s); if possible, run placebo tests

Given the prospect of spurious correlation, one must clearly identify one or more candidate causal mechanism(s) and instrument(s) that would both directly reflect the mechanism(s) and pass the relevance and exclusion criteria for instruments. It is simply too easy to find variables that follow the same time series pattern as the endogenous regressor and the dependent variable to trust an instrument that lacks a credible theory of the causal mechanism. Some variables that follow similar trends are obviously spurious, as we illustrated with the case of global audio cassette tape sales. But for many others, an analyst might be understandably tempted to inductively rationalize a mechanism that justifies a seemingly-relevant instrument. In the case of US food aid shipments,

for example, we have already shown that real interest rates appear relevant as a proxy for US food aid shipments. One might imagine telling a story of how rising real interest rates depress consumer demand and raise the cost of holding grain stocks, thereby increasing food aid shipments. The danger of spurious regressions based on seemingly-relevant instruments is very real.

One way to test the plausibility of the causal mechanism one hypothesizes is to find a suitable placebo. In some cases, the placebo can arise from changes that occur within the sample period. Indeed, if during the step 1 temporal disaggregation of the data one notices distinct sub-periods within the data where the hypothesized relationship holds and others where it does not, a natural candidate placebo test arises from any change(s) that might have occurred to the hypothesized mechanism during the sample period. Alternatively, there might be within-sample cross-sectional variation – other than in the dimension of the interacted instrument, D_i – such that one sub-sample should exhibit the hypothesized mechanism and the other should not. Many data sets and hypothesized causal mechanisms thereby offer natural placebo tests through sample splitting, if one just studies the mechanism to identify prospective separatives.

Let us illustrate with reference to NQ, which offers a very plausible mechanism to link the endogenous regressor, US food aid shipments, to the chosen instrument, lagged US wheat production. For many years, US farm policies effectively obliged the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) to purchase wheat in high production years when prices fell. NQ argue that the addition to USDA-held wheat stocks translated into extra wheat food aid sent mainly to the most regular US food aid recipients. Those claims are demonstrably true and previously established (Barrett and Maxwell 2005). NQ then cleverly exploit the resulting difference in additional food aid allocations between high and low US wheat production years across regular and irregular food aid recipients to try to identify a causal effect of food aid flows on conflict in recipient countries.

NQ failed to acknowledge, however, a crucial change in US farm support and food aid procurement policies over the sample period (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005). Most notably, the wheat price support policies that provide the exogenous mechanism linking lagged US wheat production to food aid shipments changed, starting with the 1985 Farm Bill and culminating in the 1996 Farm Bill, which formally uncoupled government purchases from price or production targets (Willis and

O'Brien, 2015).¹⁶ This policy change implies that NQ's hypothesized first stage relationship between US wheat production and food aid deliveries should be strongest prior to 1985 and should disappear or at least attenuate after 1996. Note that variation by sub-period would be consistent with the period-differentiated effects we observed in step 1.

The latter portion of the sample period therefore offers a natural placebo test as the US government wheat procurement mechanism tapered off after 1985. But, as shown in detail in Appendix 2, however, the placebo test fails when we re-estimate for sub-samples before the 1985 policy shift announcement, from 1985-1996, and after the wheat price stabilization policy completely ended in 1996. Rather than finding the hypothesized positive first and second stage relationship in the pre-1985 period, and no correlation in the latter period, we find a positive association both between food aid deliveries and wheat production (the first stage) and between conflict and instrumented food aid (the 2SLS estimates) in both the early (pre-1985) and latter (post-1996) periods. The pre-1985 estimates when the mechanism was mostly strongly in effect are statistically indistinguishable from the post-1996 ones when the hypothesized mechanism no longer existed. This fails the placebo test that naturally arises from an exogenous change in the hypothesized mechanism during the sample period.

The US also operates multiple food aid programs, not each of which would be amenable to the surplus disposal mechanism NQ hypothesize. As explained in Appendix 2, the evolution of US food aid shipments by program type correspond closely in time with the changes in farm policy. So effectively we ran a joint time series and cross-sectional placebo test. The failure to pass the placebo test meant to certify the plausibility of the hypothesized causal mechanism as the true source of identification should serve as a red flag for prospective spurious regression problems, since the statistical association exists in sub-samples where it should not.

Step 4: Test for trend and difference stationarity

¹⁶ Following the 1996 Farm Bill, the USDA was still enabled, though not obligated, to purchase wheat through the Commodities Credit Corporation. It is possible that wheat yields would remain associated with price or supply changes that could differentially create incentives to purchase wheat for food aid shipments under the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust or 416(b) programs in years with elevated wheat production, rather than draw on government-held stocks. However, such episodes have been very infrequent and when they have occurred, the bulk of the wheat procured has been used primarily for non-emergency Title II shipments that are monetized by the recipient NGO, i.e., not in emergency situations where food aid might prolong a conflict, as NQ hypothesize.

Incorrect dynamic specification of the regression of interest is the source of the spurious regressions problem. So one needs to make a concerted effort to establish the most appropriate dynamic specification. The problem is that one never knows the true underlying ARIMA process underlying the time series. It is thus highly unlikely that standard, simple specifications –such as including a (potentially groupwise-) linear time trend or year fixed effects in the presence of interacted instrument – will render the error term iid. One needs to test directly for trend and difference stationarity in the underlying series and then correct for them, if/as necessary. As shown earlier, such correction resolves the spurious regressions problem.

The natural place to start is with non-stationarity tests of the dependent variable, the endogenous regressor, and the instrument series to check for difference and/or trend stationarity. Then difference and/or de-trend series as appropriate to the test results. Then estimate the OLS and IV models having appropriately corrected for the time series properties of the underlying variable. When the instrument is an interaction between a plausibly exogenous time series variable and a potentially endogenous cross sectional variable, researchers might begin by conducting an augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test to the time series component. The interacted instrument, dependent variable, and endogenous variable will typically be panel variables, so panel versions of unit root tests are needed for those. In Appendix 2, we use a Fisher-type test relying on ADF tests of each panel in the NQ data to test the hypothesis that all panels have a unit root and a Hadri test of the null hypothesis that all panels are stationary. These tests routinely fail to reject the unit root null and do reject the stationarity null, respectively, suggesting that the time series properties that we flag as potential cause for concern in panel IV estimation indeed pose an issue in these data.

Complete correction for trend stationarity is difficult in practice. For the panel variables, when unit root tests indicate that all panels are non-stationary, differencing should be applied. But these tests will often indicate that at least one panel, but not all panels, contain a unit root. In such cases, no one-size-fits-all correction works. Researchers might then report multiple specifications with different trends, as we do in Appendix 2. Because interacted instruments allow researchers more degrees of freedom in choosing time trends, reporting one specification with an F-statistic above 10 is not a guarantee that instruments are robust. It is therefore good practice to report F-statistics and Anderson-Rubin (AR) confidence intervals for the coefficient of interest under multiple specifications that control for different trend specifications (linear, quadratic, etc.).

NQ report results controlling for a linear trend, for lagged dependent variables, and using other conventional controls without testing for trend or difference stationarity in the underlying series. As we show in Appendix 2, ADF tests fail to reject the null of difference stationary series. And as we demonstrated in Table 3, re-estimating their model using first-differenced series overturns their core findings. But even if one just includes a quadratic rather than a linear trend in their regressions, without first-differencing, their results evaporate. Any association NQ identify cannot be distinguished from any other that might exhibit a quadratic trend, including both random cycles arising from summed errors over years or omitted variables with quadratic trends.

Step 5: Run Young's bootstrap test for overleveraged observations

Young (2018) demonstrates how conventional tests of significance in IV can be wrong. The primary issue Young identifies is high leverage of a small number of observations or clusters of observations. He convincingly demonstrates this by re-estimating IV regressions, dropping one cluster at a time and bootstrapping the resulting p-values. This seems a very sensible check to employ in any IV estimation.

Yet Young's procedure does not necessarily address the concern we describe for the simple reason that correlated trends are a different problem from leverage. In the limit, a time series with no variation around its trend has zero observation-specific leverage. Dropping one country (or one year) from the analysis does not generally change the estimation results because identification is coming from trends that are common across countries (and years). Our concern about spurious regressions in IV estimation thus complements Young's. We therefore favor including Young's diagnostic tests once one has corrected to the maximum extent possible for any difference or trend stationarity present in the time series so that the iid assumption (approximately) holds.

As we show in Appendix 2, when we implement Young's bootstrap test on the NQ data, we find that the p-values of the coefficient estimates rise slightly, but remain significant at the five percent level. Over-leverage does not appear to be a first-order concern in that specific paper.

Step 6: Check the instrument using a randomization placebo test

Step 3 advocated the use of a placebo test to ensure that when the hypothesized causal mechanism is not in effect, the IV estimator fails to reject the null hypothesis of no effect. If the

IV estimator still rejects the null when it should not, that signals that some other (spurious) source of correlation must be the source of the observed partial correlation between the instrumented regressor and the outcome of interest. In the continuous interacted (e.g., Bartik) instruments case, one way to run the placebo test is to preserve the meta-structure of the data, but randomize the endogenous regressor among observations at the intensive margin, generating a randomized ‘pseudo-dose’ for which there should be null response. More specifically, we randomly reassign non-zero observed values among cross-sectional units within a given time period, holding constant everything else in the data. This disables the hypothesized causal mechanism through randomization while preserving the two sources of bias that concern us: the potentially-endogenous shift-share instrument, and the time series structure of the instrument, (aggregated) endogenous regressor, and outcome variable. If the IV estimator still rejects the zero correlation null, this would seem strong evidence that spurious regressions or of violation of the exogeneity/excludability criteria for instruments explain the original result, not the hypothesized causal mechanism. We randomize and estimate 1,000 replicates to generate the distribution of the placebo test parameter. As best as we can tell, this appears a novel randomization placebo test method.¹⁷

Appendix 2 describes in detail how we implement this novel randomization placebo test with the NQ data. This method preserves the annual aggregate US food aid flows, but reassigns actual values for a given year among countries that received food aid shipments that year. Recall that the hypothesized mechanism is that the aggregate food aid supply shock attributable to a US wheat production shock the preceding year propagates disproportionately to the most frequent food aid recipients. So we preserve the entire interacted instrument, including the (potentially endogenous) shift-share cross-sectional component, but match these with some other recipient country’s food aid flow that year. Since the true shipment to, say, Guatemala, cannot possibly explain variation in conflict in, say, Bangladesh, this randomization generates a placebo test while preserving the whole sample size (and associated precision) and, importantly, any spurious regressions due to non-iid errors. If indeed food aid flows are the cause of the IV estimate on conflict through a mechanism based on differential exposure to the time series innovations in the instrument, then the randomization placebo test should eliminate the correlation, a placebo test.

¹⁷ This randomization placebo test is somewhat similar to the randomization method Keller (1998) employs. We thank Joe Kaboski for pointing this out.

As we show in Appendix 2, the placebo test still rejects the null, signaling that the correlation observed in the data does not arise due to the causal mechanism NQ claim. Indeed, we find the placebo test IV parameter estimate distribution shifts markedly upwards relative to the NQ estimate, signaling that any true causal effect food aid might have on recipient country conflict must be negative, not positive.

Step 7: Monte Carlo placebo tests: simulation after eliminating or reversing the causal mechanism

The placebo tests of steps 3 and 6 may not fully convince the most skeptical analyst. In the step 3 case, it may be difficult to find an appropriate sub-period or sub-sample to use; or it may just be hard to know the true null within the appropriate sub-period or sub-sample. In the step 6 case, the randomization method intentionally generates a weak instrument, which could account for null results. A more complicated but reasonably foolproof method to placebo test one's estimation results is to build a simple, stylized model to replicate the mechanisms one believes drive the associations seen in data, and then to mechanically break, or even reverse, the mechanism in the model. Monte Carlo simulation using the same data one uses in estimation but with a known data generating process (DGP) that eliminates (reverses) the causal mechanism should generate null (opposing) results. This eliminates any uncertainty about the null under the placebo test and the weak instruments problem.

Appendix 2 details the Monte Carlo model we build to replicate the relationship NQ hypothesize between US food aid flows and conflict, except that we expressly eliminate the causal link. Then we introduce a DGP in which food aid flows stochastically reduce the incidence of conflict, reversing the causal mechanism relative to NQ's hypothesis. When we then simulate coefficient estimates using the NQ data, we find that even when food aid flows are statistically independent of conflict in the true DGP, the NQ estimation strategy yield estimates spuriously suggesting a causal effect of food aid flows on conflict. The estimation strategy fails the Monte Carlo placebo test. Indeed, even when we construct the DGP so that food aid flows causally reduce conflict, we show that spurious regressions will generate OLS and 2SLS parameter estimates qualitatively identical to NQ's. The takeaway message is powerful. We can replicate the NQ results even if US food aid agencies prefer to send food aid to conflict-affected countries – as is the stated policy of the US food aid program (but opposite to how NQ explain the sign shift between their OLS and 2SLS estimates) – and food aid has no causal effect on – or even *prevents* (not prolongs)

– civil conflict in recipient countries. The key drivers of this result are (i) greater long-run variation than short-run variation in the exogenous component of the instrument (US wheat production) and the outcome variable (conflict), combined with (ii) spurious correlation in those longer-run trends, as we already showed characterizes the underlying data. These results strongly suggest that NQ’s findings arise from spurious regressions, not from a true causal effect of US food aid flows on recipient country conflict.

If one follows these seven diagnostic steps, identifying and correcting for any difference and trend stationarity in the time series, and passing Young’s test and the various placebo tests we propose, then one could reasonably conclude that panel IV estimates are indeed causal. But if the panel IV results fail multiple of these diagnostic tests, as we show in Appendix 2 the NQ results do, then one should conclude that no true causal relationship existed.

IV. Conclusions

In this paper, we show that a panel data IV estimation strategy that has become popular among researchers seeking to identify the causes of conflict and other key outcomes may be subject to heretofore unrecognized inferential errors. The most likely source of error arises from spurious regressions if the time series properties of the panel variables render the regression errors non-iid. Interacted (e.g., Bartik) instruments do not resolve that problem; they merely rescale it. Much like Bazzi and Clemens (2013), we offer a caution about instrument validity and strength in panel data IV estimation. We also offer seven practical diagnostic steps researchers can follow to minimize the risk of bias and mistaken inference due to spurious regressions in panel IV estimates. Applying these techniques to a celebrated recent paper that claims to find that US food aid shipments cause prolonged conflict in recipient countries, we find those results highly contestable.

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Online Appendix To Spurious Regressions and Panel IV Estimation: Revisiting the Causes of Conflict

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Appendix 1: A simple model of time trends with an interacted instrumental variable

A typical concern in the conflict literature is simultaneity bias. This concern arises when some endogenous explanatory variable X may cause conflict, but conflict may also cause changes in X . Simultaneity bias is a concern for both NQ and HI. In NQ, food aid may cause conflict, but given the stated preferences of the US government, food aid is also more likely to be shipped to countries experiencing conflict. Similarly in HI, GDP growth might reduce the risk of conflict, but conflict might also depress GDP growth.

The use of instrumental variables can address the simultaneity bias. But when the instrument is common to all or many of the sample countries, as in NQ and HI, then time series concerns enter the panel data regression. In particular, one needs to properly control for the dynamic structure of the data generating process. But in panel data estimation this is complicated by the possibility of heterogeneous dynamics across countries that are correlated with, but not caused by, the explanatory variable of interest. In the main paper, we focus on the example of a specific, random walk dynamic process. Here we present a parsimonious model that incorporates simultaneity bias into the IV context, allowing for the possibility of time trends of unknown form. The goal is to show simple conditions under which one would expect the IV estimator to return an unbiased and consistent estimate of the casual effect of aid on conflict, when the standard use of time trends or year fixed effects correctly addresses the standard concerns, and when these standard solutions may fail to address the problem.

Suppose that conflict follows the deterministic process¹:

¹ Here and in the subsequent equation we omit an idiosyncratic error term that is independent across countries and years. Including such a term simply adds additional covariance terms with zero expectation that do not have any implications for the arguments about consistency or bias we outline here.

$$Conflict_{it} = \beta^{het} X_{it} + \psi_i \tau_t \quad (A1)$$

where $Conflict_{it}$ is an indicator variable that take value one in years when there is an active armed conflict in country i in year t , zero otherwise, X_{it} is the endogenous variable of interest (e.g., food aid or GDP growth) in country i in year t , and $\psi_i \tau_t$ is an unobserved error term that has two components. τ_t is a year specific shock that is shared by all countries, and θ_i is a scale parameter expressing each countries' vulnerability to that shock. The shock could reflect factors such as climate, global macroeconomic conditions, etc. that may independently affect conflict and also be correlated with X_{it} . Such a model nests several common assumptions. If ψ_i is constant so that $\psi_i = \psi$ for all i , this would be a model with a common, potentially non-linear trend in conflict, most flexible represented by a vector of year fixed effects. If τ_t is a constant so that $\tau_t = \tau$ for all t , this is a model with constant country fixed effects that do not vary with time.

To capture the idea that X_{it} is possibly endogenous, but also (partly) determined by a time varying variable that could meet the exclusion restriction for an instrument, we model the endogenous variable by:

$$X_{it} = \Omega_i Z_t \quad (A2)$$

where Z_t is an instrument that varies only over time. This variable takes the same value for all countries in any given period, but the response of X_{it} to Z_t can differ in each country by a shift variable Ω_i . If $E(\Omega_i) \neq 0$, the instrument $\Omega_i Z_t$ satisfies the relevance condition to be an instrument. This model allows us to show when time trends will interfere with generating an unbiased and consistent estimate of β , and the role of endogenous X_{it} and $\Omega_i Z_t$ in the econometric challenge.

Since Z_t appears only in equation (A2) and not in equation (A1), it is a candidate instrumental variable. We can estimate β through IV via the familiar reduced form and first stage equations:

$$Conflict_{it} = \gamma^{het} Z_t + e_{it}^{het} \quad (A3)$$

$$X_{it} = \pi^{het} Z_t + u_{it}^{het} \quad (A4)$$

The estimated coefficient in reduced form equation (A3) will be:

$$\widehat{\gamma}^{het} = \frac{cov(Conflict_{it}, Z_t)}{var(Z_t)} \quad (A5)$$

Or, substituting equation (A1) for conflict:

$$\widehat{\gamma}^{het} = \frac{\widehat{cov}(\beta^{het}X_{it} + \psi_i\tau_t, Z_t)}{\widehat{var}(Z_t)}$$

$$(A6) \quad \widehat{\gamma}^{het} = \beta^{het} \frac{\widehat{cov}(X_{it}, Z_t)}{\widehat{var}(Z_t)} + \frac{\widehat{cov}(\psi_i\tau_t, Z_t)}{\widehat{var}(Z_t)}$$

$$(A7)$$

Similarly, the estimated first stage coefficient π from equation (A4) is:

$$\widehat{\pi}^{het} = \frac{\widehat{cov}(X_{it}, Z_t)}{\widehat{var}(Z_t)} \quad (A8)$$

Or substituting now equation (A2) for X_{it} :

$$\widehat{\pi}^{het} = \frac{\widehat{cov}(\Omega_i Z_t, Z_t)}{\widehat{var}(Z_t)} \quad (A9)$$

To see how the indirect least squares estimate $\widehat{\gamma}^{het} / \widehat{\pi}^{het}$ yields an estimate of the effect of X on conflict (β), we need only to substitute (A2) for X in equation (A5):

$$\widehat{\gamma}^{het} = \beta^{het} \frac{\widehat{cov}(\Omega_i Z_t, Z_t)}{\widehat{var}(Z_t)} + \frac{\widehat{cov}(\psi_i\tau_t, Z_t)}{\widehat{var}(Z_t)} \quad (A10)$$

Now dividing $\widehat{\gamma}$ by $\widehat{\pi}$ gives:

$$\frac{\widehat{\gamma}^{het}}{\widehat{\pi}^{het}} = \frac{\beta \frac{\widehat{cov}(\Omega_i Z_t, Z_t)}{\widehat{var}(Z_t)} + \frac{\widehat{cov}(\psi_i\tau_t, Z_t)}{\widehat{var}(Z_t)}}{\frac{\widehat{cov}(\Omega_i Z_t, Z_t)}{\widehat{var}(Z_t)}}$$

$$(A11)$$

Necessary conditions for the ILS estimate to be defined are:

$$E\left[\frac{\widehat{cov}(\Omega_i Z_t, Z_t)}{\widehat{var}(Z_t)}\right] \neq 0 \quad (A12)$$

$$\text{plim}_{i,t}\left[\frac{\widehat{cov}(\Omega_i Z_t, Z_t)}{\widehat{var}(Z_t)}\right] \rightarrow a \text{ where } a \neq 0 \quad (A13)$$

Conditions A12 and A13 define the relevance conditions. If they are violated, the IV estimate of β^{het} is not defined in infinite samples and will be vulnerable to the weak instruments problem in finite samples.

Our goal here is to investigate the conditions under which issues can arise for interpreting the ILS/2SLS estimate as causal when the model here is a plausible description of reality.

Identification from randomly assigned or balanced shocks

Perhaps the simplest sufficient condition for identification is the one described by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018), that the conflict shocks that are heterogeneous across countries

are as good as randomly assigned conditional on the instrument shocks. A bit more formally, sufficient conditions for the ILS estimate to be an unbiased and consistent estimate of β are:

$$E\left[\frac{cov(\psi_i\tau_t, Z_t)}{var(Z_t)}\right] = 0 \quad (A14)$$

$$plim_{i,t}\left[\frac{cov(\psi_i\tau_t, Z_t)}{var(Z_t)}\right] \rightarrow 0 \quad (A15)$$

Equations A14 and A15 express the exclusion restrictions for instrumental variables estimation. Note that by ordering θ from minimum to maximum values in $\theta \in \{k, j\}$ we can write the term containing the unobservable trend as follows²:

$$cov(\psi_i\tau_t, Z_t) = \sum_{\psi=k}^{\psi=j} \psi cov(\tau_t, Z_t)\kappa_\psi = cov(\tau_t, Z_t) \sum_{\psi=k}^{\psi=j} \psi\kappa_\psi \quad (A16)$$

where κ_ψ is the share of countries for which $\psi_i = \psi$. The last term can be further rewritten as the covariance of τ_t and Z_t times the mean of ψ_i , or $cov(\psi_i\tau_t, Z_t) = cov(\tau_t, Z_t)\bar{\psi}$. We can similarly rewrite the first stage equation as follows:

$$\frac{cov(\Omega_i Z_t, Z_t)}{var(Z_t)} = cov(Z_t, Z_t)/var(Z_t) \sum_{\Omega=k}^{\Omega=j} \Omega\kappa_\Omega = \sum_{\Omega=k}^{\Omega=j} \Omega\kappa_\Omega = \bar{\Omega} \quad (A17)$$

Rewritten this way, it becomes clear that the first stage regression simply gives us the average propensity of the endogenous variable to respond to the instrument among countries in the sample.

Rewriting the first and second stage regressions this way helps show the role of correlation between $cov(\tau_t, Z_t)$ and the IV estimator. We can now rewrite equation A11 as:

$$\frac{\widehat{\gamma^{het}}}{\widehat{\pi^{het}}} = \frac{\beta^{het}\bar{\Omega} + cov(\tau_t, Z_t)\bar{\Omega}}{\bar{\Omega}} \quad (A18)$$

Clearly, as long as $\bar{\Omega} \neq 0$, then the IV estimate returns the causal effect of the endogenous variable on conflict if and only if $cov(\tau_t, Z_t)\bar{\psi} = 0$. However, bias will arise in this model, whenever both $cov(\tau_t, Z_t) \neq 0$ and $\bar{\psi} \neq 0$, because this condition leads to a violation of the exclusion condition that the instrument is only correlated with conflict through the endogenous variable. Interpreting the IV estimate as causal therefore requires assuming at least one of the following about this model:

² This identity follows a similar approach as Borusyak et al. (2018).

1. Any unobservable shocks to conflict τ_t are uncorrelated with variation in the temporal component of the instrument Z_t
2. The effect of a conflict shock is symmetric across countries, so that increasing risk in some countries is offset by decreasing risk in other countries

The second assumption, symmetry of responses to τ , means that while individual countries may have trends in conflict, the average country does not show a trend in unobservables. While this situation may arise in some applications, it does not follow from any theory of conflict of which we are aware. While one can imagine factors that influence conflict in some countries but not others, there are no natural theories of conflict influences that predict that risk factors for some countries have an effect in the opposite direction of exactly the same magnitude, leading to $\bar{\psi} = 0$.

If we are unwilling to assume that trends in conflict trends are exactly symmetric, so that they have no average influence, then the unbiasedness and consistency of the ILS estimator hinges on whether

$$E[\text{cov}(\tau_t, Z_t)] = 0 \tag{A19}$$

$$\text{plim}_{i,t}[\text{cov}(\tau_t, Z_t)] \rightarrow 0 \tag{A20}$$

Since the earliest days of statistics and econometrics – e.g., Yule (1926), Slutsky (1937) – practitioners have recognized challenges that arise when assessing the correlation between two time series variables. Empirical correlations may arise in practice for four reasons:

1. A causal mechanism exists by which one of the two variables influences the other;
2. An omitted third variable influences both variables;
3. Both variables follow a deterministic trend in the same direction;
4. Either or both variables exhibit persistence between periods, meaning that apparent trends can arise even when there is no determinant reason for them to exist, causing the two variables to have larger than expected correlation coefficients.

The usual good practice in time series econometrics is to argue from theory that condition 1 is not met, e.g., that even if there are unobservable trends in conflict exist, it is unlikely that these trends influence US wheat production or global lending rates or vice versa, in the NQ and HI cases, respectively. Having made this argument, practitioners generally proceed by robustness checks related to concerns 2 and 3 by assessing sensitivity to adding different

specifications for trends and possible omitted variables. Much less attention is generally paid to the fourth problem.

If $cov(\tau_t, Z_t) \neq 0$ for any of the above reasons, then the simple IV estimator in equations (A11) and (A18) will be biased, and it may not be consistent. In this simple model, the bias and the inconsistency can be assigned a positive or negative sign. Since the bias term is given by $\widehat{cov}(\tau_t, Z_t)\bar{\psi}/\bar{\Omega}$, the sign of the bias will be in the same direction as the correlation of τ_t and Z_t if $\bar{\psi}$ and $\bar{\Omega}$ have the same sign, and the opposite if $\bar{\psi}$ and $\bar{\Omega}$ have opposite signs.

As noted above, the usual practice of addressing spurious correlation of τ_t, Z_t proceeds by including controls for either the influence of dynamics or observable characteristics. Using the same simple model as above, we can simply extend the ILS estimator to further understand the role of the correlation of τ_t, Z_t in this approach.

The typical approach to controlling for omitted variables or trends is to include additional variables as controls in both the first stage and reduced form regressions. The first step is to select the relevant set of control variables, M_{it} . This vector can include, for example, dummy variables indicating countries (country fixed effects), dummy variables indicating years (year fixed effects), or characteristics of countries or years that are suspected to influence conflict and may also be correlated with the instrument. Thus one follows the procedure:

- A. Estimate $Conflict_{it} = pM_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}^A$ where M_{it} is a vector of control variables, p is a vector of coefficients estimated by 2SLS, and ε_{it}^A is a standard mean zero iid error term.
- B. Form $\check{C}_{it} = Conflict_{it} - \hat{p}M_{it}$ from the coefficient estimates.
- C. Estimate $X_{it} = \psi q + \varepsilon_{it}^C$.
- D. Form $\check{X}_{it} = X_{it} - qM_{it}$ from the coefficient estimates.
- E. Estimate $Z_{it} = rM_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}^E$.
- F. Form $\check{Z}_{it} = Z_{it} - \hat{r}M_{it}$ from the coefficient estimates.
- G. Estimate the reduced form equation by $\check{C}_{it} = \gamma^{FE}\check{Z}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}^G$
- H. Estimate the first stage equation as $\check{X}_{it} = \pi^{FE}\check{Z}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}^H$
- I. Form the ILS estimator as $\widehat{\gamma^{FE}}/\widehat{\pi^{FE}}$.

The ILS estimator is now:

$$\frac{\widehat{\gamma}^{FE}}{\widehat{\pi}^{FE}} = \frac{\beta^{het} \frac{cov(\Omega_i Z_t, Z_t - \hat{r} M_{it})}{\widehat{var}(Z_t)} + \frac{cov(\psi_i \tau_t - \hat{p} M_{it}, Z_t - \hat{r} M_{it})}{\widehat{var}(Z_t)}}{\frac{cov(\psi_i Z_t - \hat{q} M_{it}, Z_t - \hat{r} M_{it})}{\widehat{var}(Z_t)}} \quad (A21)$$

This procedure changes the exclusion restriction to $E[\widehat{cov}(\psi_i \tau_t - \hat{p} M_{it}, Z_t - \hat{r} M_{it})] = 0$. To see how this specification could remove spurious regression bias in an IV, suppose that $\psi_i = 1$ for all i and both the instrument and conflict follow a linear trend so that $Z_t = ct + \xi_{it}$ and $\tau_t = dt + o_{it}$ where ξ_{it} and o_{it} are i.i.d mean zero. Then the ILS estimator in equation A18 would be biased, because $cov(Z_t, \tau_t)$ would include a correlation induced by the common trend in both variables. But by simply including $M_{it} = t$, the ILS estimator in equation A21 would now be unbiased because $E[cov(\tau_t - \hat{p}t, Z_t - \hat{q}t)] = E[cov(\xi_{it}, o_{it})] = 0$. But note that this is only true when the trends are linear. If the true trend in both variables is instead quadratic, but we estimate the ILS estimate using $M_{it} = t$ rather than $M_{it} = t^2$, then ILS estimator in (A21) would again be both biased and inconsistent in estimating β , because the error between the true trends and the estimate linear trends would be increasing over time and correlated across the two variables. Similarly, if one includes the wrong specification for control variables, the ILS estimator will again be both biased and inconsistent. The takeaway message here is that without knowing the true dynamic processes, it is unlikely that one can remove the bias.

To avoid the problem of having to know the true specification of any underlying trends, a common practice is to include a flexibly estimated time trend by including dummy variables for each year in the set of controls, M_{it} . The advantage of including year fixed effects is that one does not need to know whether the trends in τ_t are linear, quadratic or otherwise. The disadvantage is that dummy variables for each year can not be included because $M_{it} = Z_t$ implies that $Z_t - \hat{r} M_{it}$ has no variation.

In order to estimate a version of the ILS estimator that can accommodate the flexible estimation of trends through the inclusion of year fixed effects, a common approach is to replace the instrument, which varies only in the time series with an interaction of two variables, one which varies across cross-sectional in the same year. This approach is sometimes called a shift-share or a Bartik instrument.

To see how the shift-share instrument works, suppose we observe the true Ω_i . Then we could replace the instrument Z_t with $\Omega_i Z_t$. Since $\Omega_i Z_t$ varies across both countries and years, we can repeat steps A-I above, but include both a full set of dummy variables indicating

countries (country fixed effects) and a full set of dummy variables indicating years (year fixed effects) in the set of controls M_{it} . This results in the following ILS estimator:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\widehat{\gamma}^{het}}{\widehat{\pi}^{het}} &= \frac{\beta^{het} \frac{cov\left((\Omega_i - \bar{\Omega})(Z_t - \bar{Z}), (\theta_i - \bar{\theta})(Z_t - \bar{Z})\right) + \frac{cov\left((\theta_i - \bar{\theta})(\tau_t - \bar{\tau}), (\Omega_i - \bar{\Omega})(Z_t - \bar{Z})\right)}{var\left((\Omega_i - \bar{\Omega})(Z_t - \bar{Z})\right)}}{var\left((\Omega_i - \bar{\Omega})(Z_t - \bar{Z})\right)} + \frac{cov\left((\theta_i - \bar{\theta})(\tau_t - \bar{\tau}), (\Omega_i - \bar{\Omega})(Z_t - \bar{Z})\right)}{var\left((\Omega_i - \bar{\Omega})(Z_t - \bar{Z})\right)} \\ &= \beta^{het} + \frac{cov\left((\psi_i - \bar{\psi})(\tau_t - \bar{\tau}), (\Omega_i - \bar{\Omega})(Z_t - \bar{Z})\right)}{var\left((\Omega_i - \bar{\Omega})(Z_t - \bar{Z})\right)} \end{aligned} \quad (A22)$$

To further simplify this expression, it is useful to again follow the numerical equivalency approach of Borusyak et al. (2018), and note that by ordering ψ and Ω by their minimum and maximum values in $\psi \in \{k, j\}$ and $\Omega \in \{m, n\}$ we can write $cov\left((\psi_i - \bar{\psi})(\tau_t - \bar{\tau}), (\Omega_i - \bar{\Omega})(Z_t - \bar{Z})\right)$ as:

$$\sum_{\psi=k}^{\psi=j} \sum_{\Omega=m}^{\Omega=n} (\psi - \bar{\psi})(\Omega - \bar{\Omega}) cov\left((\tau_t - \bar{\tau}), (Z_t - \bar{Z})\right) \kappa_{\psi\Omega} \quad (A23)$$

where $\kappa_{\psi\Omega}$ is the share of countries for whom $\psi_i = \psi$ and $\Omega_i = \Omega$. Then the ILS estimator from a shift-share IV is:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\widehat{\gamma}^{het}}{\widehat{\pi}^{het}} &= \beta^{het} + \frac{cov\left((\tau_t - \bar{\tau}), (Z_t - \bar{Z})\right) \sum_{\psi=k}^{\psi=j} \sum_{\Omega=m}^{\Omega=n} (\psi - \bar{\psi})(\Omega - \bar{\Omega}) \kappa_{\psi\Omega}}{var\left((\Omega_i - \bar{\Omega})(Z_t - \bar{Z})\right)} \\ &= \beta^{het} + \frac{cov\left((\tau_t - \bar{\tau}), (Z_t - \bar{Z})\right) cov\left((\psi_i - \bar{\psi}), (\Omega_i - \bar{\Omega})\right)}{var\left((\Omega_i - \bar{\Omega})(Z_t - \bar{Z})\right)} \end{aligned} \quad (A24)$$

Note that the covariance of τ and Z_t still appears here as a possible bias term. Note if Ω is constant so that $\Omega_i = \bar{\Omega}$, then the estimator is not defined, so the ILS estimate will be biased if $cov\left((\tau_t - \bar{\tau}), (Z_t - \bar{Z})\right) \neq 0$ and $cov\left((\psi_i - \bar{\psi}), (\Omega_i - \bar{\Omega})\right) \neq 0$. In many applications, it will not be the case that $cov\left((\psi_i - \bar{\psi}), (\Omega_i - \bar{\Omega})\right) = 0$. For example, in NQ this assumption would mean that countries at higher risk of conflict are differentially more likely to receive aid.

Starting with a simple model of unobservable trends in conflict with (possibly) heterogeneous impact on different countries, we can now summarize the assumptions required for the ILS estimator to be an unbiased and consistent estimator of the causal effect of the endogenous variable X on conflict:

1. If the IV/ILS estimator is formed using the uninteracted time series variable, Z_t , and no controls are included as in equations A11 and A18, then unbiasedness and consistency requires one of the following two assumptions
 1. a. $\bar{\psi} = 0$ or

1. *b.* $cov(Z_t, \tau_t) = 0$
2. If the IV/ILS estimator is formed using the uninteracted time series variable and controls such as a parametric time trend as in equation A21, then unbiasedness and consistency of the ILS/IV estimator requires that the influence of the omitted controls, such as a time trend, is exactly correctly specified
3. If the IV/ILS estimator is formed by an interaction of the time series instrument Z_t and a variable that varies across countries to allow for the inclusion of both country and year fixed effects, then unbiased and consistency of the ILS/IV estimator requires the following assumptions:
 3. *a.* $\psi_i = \bar{\psi}$
 3. *b.* $cov((\psi_i - \bar{\psi}), (\Omega_i - \bar{\Omega})) = 0$
 3. *c.* $cov((\tau_t - \bar{\tau}), (Z_t - \bar{Z})) \neq 0$

Assumptions 1.a. and 2.a. are quite specific, and unknowable in practice. Exact symmetry of heterogeneity in trends (1.a.) would only be justified in very specific, likely rare, circumstances. Since we do not observe the sources of trends, 2.a. is unverifiable except through imprecise processes such as inspection of trends, and will generally be difficult to justify through theory.

The implausibility of these assumptions means that one of two approaches is typically popular. Either one assumes that $cov(Z_t, \tau_t) = 0$ or one uses the interacted IV approach.

However, the assumptions necessary even under the interacted IV approach are also quite strong. Assumption 3.a. requires that any unobservable trends in conflict are homogenous across countries. That is to say, if a year is a “bad year” for conflict, all countries are equally at risk. Given that some countries exhibit much more conflict than others and at risk countries seem to express spikes in conflict in related years, this seems an inappropriate assumption for the conflict case.

Assumption 3.b. requires that heterogeneity in conflict trends is exogenous to heterogeneity in the response to the instrument. This is a difficult assumption to justify in practice, because the heterogeneity must itself be random. For example, in the NQ case, if countries were randomly assigned to receive more food aid the year after US wheat production was elevated, then this assumption would be met. But since if US food aid flows follow stated

policy and explicitly target aid to countries at risk of conflict, then this assumption will not be met.

In summary, unless one is able to defend the strenuous assumptions in 1.a, 2, 3.a., or 3.b., one is left to conclude that the IV estimator will be biased unless trends in conflict are uncorrelated with the time series component of the instrument.

The volatility of correlations between two time-series variables is a problem apparently unrecognized in the applied economics literature using instruments in time series or panel settings, although it has long been recognized in the time series literature. First noted by Yule (1926) and finally described analytically by Ernst et al. (2016), the problem of volatile correlations (which Yule called “nonsense correlations”) arises when one or both variables is highly dependent on its own past history. Such variables will often appear in finite samples to follow trends or cycles as described by Slutsky (1937). Thus, when two such variables are regressed on each other, they can appear to be highly correlated, indeed at much higher rates than would be expected from standard inference under the assumption that both variables are i.i.d. over time. The practical implication of this problem for panel IV settings is that even if $cov(Z_t, \tau_t) = 0$ in an infinitely long sample of years, the correlation between τ_t and Z_t may be quite large in any given sample. Unless one of the more stringent assumptions 1.a., 2., 3.a., or 3.b. is met, this means that the bias in a given sample may be large. In general, for a given correlation between a time series variable Z_t and unobservable trends τ_t , this bias will be determined by the direction of endogeneity between the heterogeneity of the trend and the heterogeneous response of the endogenous variable X_{it} to the instrument Z_t .

Visual inspection of the conflict dependent variable plotted across years suggests that conflict is a trending variable (Figure 3) and these trends are heterogeneous across countries (Figure 8). To explore the bias that could arise from these trends, in the main body of the paper we simulate the interacted IV model using heterogeneous trends using a set of placebo instruments where the instrument has characteristics known to create a risk of volatile correlations, specifically variables that follow a random walk. We find that the expected problem arises in the simulation. Placebo instruments show large and significant correlations in both the reduced form and first stage equations. The direction of rejection is not random, as would be expected if determined by the endogeneity of the heterogeneity in trends and responses to the instruments. On average a placebo instrument is much more likely to identify a positive effect of

aid on conflict than a negative effect and much more likely to identify a negative effect of economic growth on conflict than a positive effect. While we can't rule out that these effects arise from the causal effect of these endogenous variables on conflict, these patterns raise major concerns about inference. If instruments that are known to be spurious identify the same or larger effects as the proposed instruments on average, much stricter standards for theoretical justification for instruments is required than simply a plausible argument that an instrument might be associated with the endogenous variable and a first stage and reduced form regression that both show statistical significance.

Appendix 2: Applying the Seven Practical Diagnostic Steps For Panel IV Estimation to Revisit NQ

In this appendix, we apply the seven practical diagnostic steps for panel IV estimation, as advanced in the main paper, to revisit the celebrated Nunn and Qian (2014, hereafter NQ) study. We focus on the NQ results because they have been widely publicized and inform an intensely debated policy issue that is especially timely as the future of US foreign assistance and food aid in particular are under serious scrutiny in Washington. If a policy commonly labeled “humanitarian” actually causes violent conflict, that policy should be revisited. We show through a sequence of diagnostic tests that their headline finding – that US food aid shipments cause prolonged conflict in recipient countries – does not pass several placebo tests, and appear to result not from the causal mechanism they posit but instead from spurious regressions arising from longer-run trends in nonstationary data series, combined with a shift-share instrument that fails the exogeneity criterion for valid instruments. Indeed, Monte Carlo simulations explained below demonstrate that the NQ results could actually arise from a data generating process in which food aid is independent of or even *reduces* conflict, contrary to their core claim.

We note that the results reported by NQ have also been disputed by USAID (2014), who report on robustness of the NQ strategy to controlling for other forms of non-food aid external support for actors in civil conflicts including use of external military bases and economic support for rebels. USAID suggests that when these variables are included as controls, the statistical significance of food aid disappears. Unfortunately, the USAID results are not directly comparable to the NQ strategy for two reasons. First, external support to combatants only occurs by definition when a conflict exists. Food aid, on the other hand is sent to both countries that are experiencing conflict and those that are not, so that the NQ dataset can leverage information from countries that are not actively experiencing conflict. Second, the external aid variable is not available for the earliest years of NQ’s dataset. If NQ identify an association that is strongest in the early period, as we show below is the case, then the USAID estimation strategy could miss the effect by omitting those years. USAID argues that the NQ results are fragile with regard to these robustness checks, but they are not able to fully explain why the NQ strategy identifies a positive association between aid and conflict. The threats to identification we identify through the seven diagnostic test steps detailed in this appendix directly explains both why NQ found an effect, and why one should conclude that it is a spurious, not a causal, association.

Step 1: Carefully visually inspect the data

An intuitive way to show how such time trends influence NQ's IV estimate is to reproduce the plots NQ use to explain and demonstrate their strategy, highlighting changes across decades. Figure B1 reproduces the NQ's Figures 3 and 4, which show the relationship between US wheat production and the proportion of countries in each year who are experiencing a conflict. The bottom panel shows the relationship among only the 50% of countries that received aid from the US most frequently – in at least 30% of periods – while the top panel is the 50% of countries that received aid least frequently during the study period. NQ use these plots to show that that wheat production is related to conflict, but only among frequent recipients of US aid, presenting an intuitively appealing demonstration for what is effectively the reduced form in their IV strategy.




FIGURE B1: THE ESSENCE OF THE NUNN AND QIAN IV STRATEGY

Notes: The figure above replicates the core results from figures 3 and 4 in NQ. Because this paper focuses on the presence of any type of conflict as the headline result from the NQ study, the y-axis is proportion of countries experiencing any type of conflict rather than only intrastate conflicts as in the original NQ figures. The figures are qualitatively very similar if only intrastate conflicts are used.

But given that wheat production displays a pronounced nonlinear trend in the sample (Figure 3), it is useful to group observations that are near each other in time. Figure B2 (A3) reproduces the preceding figure for the low (high) frequency food aid recipients, with different markers and colors representing different decades. As we know from the fact that both food aid and conflict followed the same inverted-U shape trend during this period as US lagged wheat production (Figure 3), all of the years with high wheat production and elevated incidence of conflict occur in the 1980s and 1990s (grey diamonds and dark blue squares, respectively), while all the years with low wheat production and high conflict occur in the 1970s and 2000s (light blue circles and black triangles, respectively).




FIGURE B2: LINEAR TRENDS IN CIVIL CONFLICT INCIDENCE FOR COUNTRIES WITH $\bar{D} < 0.3$ (IRREGULAR AID RECIPIENTS) BY DECADE




FIGURE B3: LINEAR TRENDS IN CIVIL CONFLICT INCIDENCE FOR COUNTRIES WITH $\bar{D} \geq 0.3$ (REGULAR AID RECIPIENTS) BY DECADE

These time trends are important for NQ, because their instrument is based on the interaction of US wheat production and a country's long-term propensity to receive aid. Lagged wheat production drives the plausible exogeneity of the instrument, but it only varies by year. NQ's results depend on conflict increasing more among regular recipients than among irregular recipients when lagged US wheat production is high.

Figures B2 and B3 show what happens when depicting the reduced form relationship between lagged wheat production and conflict – the reduced form relationship of interest – for irregular and regular recipients separately by decade. In Figure B2, we see that if anything, within any given decade, food aid and conflict are negatively correlated among irregular food aid recipients. What had previously appeared to be a flat relationship in the top panel of Figure B1 was driven by the fact that US wheat production and global conflict were both higher in the 1980s and 1990s. Among the regular recipients, Figure B3 shows that food aid appears related to conflict in the 1970s and possibly the 2000s, but not at all in the 1980s and 1990s. What appeared to be a globally positive relationship between lagged wheat production and conflict in the bottom panel of Figure 1 is entirely driven by a transition in the late 1970s to a period of high US wheat production and high recipient country conflict and back to a period of lower US wheat production and global conflict over the 2000s. This transition corresponds to a period of dramatic shifts in US

farm price policy (on which, more below) that broke the hypothesized narrative of a mandated link between wheat production and government-held wheat stocks and during which US food aid policy began expressly prioritizing the shipment of emergency food aid to conflict-affected countries.

What matters for the average relationship that NQ identify is the difference in the conflict-wheat relationship between regular versus irregular aid recipients. This is shown in Figure B4. Their hypothesized effect seems present in the 1970s, but otherwise, the global relationship is almost entirely driven by the long-term changes rather than the more plausibly random short-term fluctuations of wheat output around that trend, off which they ostensibly identify causal effects. Moreover, if there is an upward relationship in the differences shown below for the 1990s, then it is entirely driven by the fact that average conflict was declining in irregular recipients when wheat production was low rather than the fact that it was increasing in regular recipients, among whom it was actually flat or declining, as shown in Figures A2-A4, respectively.



FIGURE B4: LINEAR TRENDS IN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AVERAGE CIVIL CONFLICT INCIDENCE FOR COUNTRIES WITH $\bar{D} \geq 0.3$ AND COUNTRIES WITH $\bar{D} < 0.3$ (REGULAR MINUS IRREGULAR AID RECIPIENTS) BY DECADE

By itself, the coincident trends between lagged wheat production and conflict do not necessarily mean that NQ's IV strategy does not identify a causal effect of aid on conflict. But the visual inspection of the time series by sub-period makes clear the source(s) of identifying variation is limited to the 1970s. One possibility, discussed in more detail in step 2 below, is that the driving causal mechanism was most salient only during that sub-period. But it is equally possible that since variation in wheat and conflict appears mostly driven by long decadal changes rather than year to year variation, there could well be omitted cyclical factors that are related to both wheat production and conflict. It is entirely possible that the evolution of two unrelated processes could correlate for a short period of time by coincidence, i.e., the spurious regression problem. Given that food aid is, by program design, intentionally directed toward countries most at risk of conflict, such coincidence would generate spurious correlation and bias in NQ's IV estimates.

Step 2: Run OLS regression, identify most likely direction of bias, then interrogate 2SLS estimates

NQ first estimate an OLS specification³ where the indicator variable for the presence of conflict in a given country during a given year is regressed on the quantity of wheat food aid delivered to that country:

$$C_{irt} = \beta F_{irt} + \mathbf{X}_{irt}\Gamma + \phi_{rt} + \psi_{ir} + v_{irt} \quad (\text{B1})$$

where C_{irt} is an indicator variable which equals one if country i in region r experiences at least 25 deaths from battle involving two parties in year t , F_{irt} is the endogenous quantity of wheat aid shipments to country i in year t , \mathbf{X}_{irt} is a set of country and year controls, ϕ_{rt} is a set of region-specific year fixed effects, and ψ_{ir} is a set of country fixed effects.

The OLS estimates of equation B1 suggest that additional food aid is associated with a lower incidence of conflict; but this result is not statistically significant. This result implies that within countries, there is no greater risk of conflict in years when a greater quantity of wheat aid is received from the United States, and within years, countries that receive a greater quantity of wheat aid have no greater risk of conflict.

NQ justifiably worry that this relationship could be biased, however, because food aid deliveries may be endogenous to conflict incidence. Since stated US government policy directs

³ Here we repeat the notation exactly as it appears in the original NQ paper for comparability

food aid flows to conflict affected countries, the bias in the OLS estimates should be upward. The fact that US food aid flows disproportionately to food aid affected countries is easily corroborated in the data.

In NQ's case, so as to obtain a causal estimate of the effect of food aid on conflict, they estimate a 2SLS specification:

$$F_{irt} = \alpha(P_{t-1} * \bar{D}_{ir}) + X_{irt}\Gamma + \phi_{rt} + \psi_{ir} + E_{irt} \quad (\text{B2})$$

Equation B1 remains the equation of interest. The first stage, shown in equation B2, interacts P_{t-1} , annual US wheat production lagged by one year,⁴ and \bar{D}_{ir} , the proportion of the 36 years in which country i received a non-zero quantity of wheat aid from the US. NQ exploit the plausible exogeneity of P_{t-1} to identify the key parameter of interest, β , in the second stage.

The justification for this first stage is that when additional wheat is available because of high production (P_{t-1}), additional aid is sent to regular food aid recipients, which goes disproportionately to the favored aid partners. Including the country and year fixed effects, α is then analogous to a continuous difference-in-differences (DD) coefficient estimate, where the variation in the instrument comes from comparing aid between high and low wheat production years and between regular and irregular aid recipients. Any confounding variables that have a common effect on conflict across all countries within a region in the same year, such as weather or climate or global market prices, or characteristics of countries that have a constant effect on conflict prevalence over time are controlled for through region-year and country fixed effects.

In their preferred specification, NQ estimate equation B1 via 2SLS with the interacted instrument in first stage equation B2 used for endogenous food aid quantity, and find that “a 1,000 MT increase in US wheat aid increases the incidence of conflict by .3 percentage points.” At the sample means, their estimated food aid elasticity of conflict incidence is 0.4, a large enough magnitude to warrant serious policy attention.

NQ's 2SLS conclusions depend crucially on the credibility of the exclusion restriction behind their IV strategy, which is that lagged US wheat production conditional on the set of controls reported in the paper is correlated with conflict *only* through the following channel. Positive shocks from higher wheat production year-on-year lead the US government to purchase more wheat, which leads food aid agencies to distribute more wheat the following year. The

⁴ Lagged one year due to the time required to plan and implement food aid deliveries.

resulting extra food aid is shipped primarily to frequent food aid recipients where pre-existing administrative and logistical arrangements make variation in food aid volumes at the intensive margin more feasible. These added food aid receipts cause conflict prevalence to increase, in particular by prolonging the duration of conflict.⁵

The first concern with the NQ IV strategy is the prospective endogeneity of \bar{D}_{it} which, after all, includes food aid receipts from *all* years in the sample. Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018) offer a detailed technical exploration of this issue in shift-share instruments, to which we direct interested readers. In the present context, the crucial thing to understand is that US food aid shipments exhibit strong persistence over time (Barrett, 1998; Jayne et al, 2002; Barrett and Heisey, 2002). Barrett (1998) shows that historically the probability of a country receiving future food aid flows conditional on past food aid receipt is 85% or greater out to horizons of 35 years of prior food aid receipt. A shock, like conflict, that sparks the initiation of emergency food aid flows is therefore likely to have persistent effects on food aid flows.

Note that NQ find no evidence that food aid causes conflict to begin. Their claim is that food aid flows cause prolongation of a conflict. But if initiation of conflict is independent of food aid flows, as NQ find, and there exists reverse causality, per US government policy, then persistence in food aid flows can render \bar{D}_{it} endogenous and vulnerable to the Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018) critique.

Figure B5 demonstrates the persistence of food aid flows in the particular years and countries of the NQ dataset by showing the distribution of years of duration of aid spells, defined as a continuous period over which a country receives aid in each year. We separately plot the distribution of spell lengths where there was a conflict in the country in the first year of the spell from those where the country was not in conflict when the spell began. Figure B5 clearly shows that once food aid starts flowing, the country is likely to continue receiving aid for many subsequent years. This is especially true if the recipient country experiences conflict in the year

⁵ The exact channel by which this last stage occurs is not clear. NQ argue that the extra food aid is vulnerable to theft, which allows rebels to continue fighting longer than they otherwise would. But this seems to contradict findings in the literature that show that exogenous sources of income growth are often associated with lower conflict (Blattman and Miguel 2010, Ray and Esteban 2017). The mechanisms that would explain why income from aid deliveries would be more likely to be stolen by rebels and increase conflict while income from other sources often reduces fighting have not been established.

when the spell starts. This highlights the fact that aid allocations are highly endogenous; once aid starts flowing to a country, it is likely to continue, and this is especially true in conflict situations.




FIGURE B5: LENGTH OF AID SPELLS IN YEARS BY INITIAL CONFLICT STATUS

Notes: An aid spell is the number of uninterrupted years between observing a country receiving any wheat aid following either a year with no wheat aid or the start of the dataset, and the first subsequent year in which that country does not receive aid. The histogram shows the density of aid spells for countries not experiencing a conflict in the first year of the dataset. The overlaid kernel density plot shows the density of all aid spells for countries that did have a conflict in the starting spell.




FIGURE B6: STARTING YEARS OF LONG AID SPELLS

Notes: Lowess plot of an indicator for whether an aid spell in a given year lasted ≥ 5 years, by the starting year of the spell.

The degree of persistence has also changed over time as aid allocation priorities have changed. Figure B6 shows the percentage of aid spells that last at least five years, conditional on the year in which the spell started. Wheat aid was significantly more persistent in the 1970s when most food aid flowed as (Title I PL480) annual concessional exports to governments with established Title I programs. This persistence lessened in the 1980s and 1990s as Title II grants to NGOs and WFP began to replace Title I, catering to a different set of countries. The persistence grew stronger again in the 2000s when USAID began concentrating non-emergency Title II flows on just a few countries that routinely had emergency Title II flows for two reasons. First, USAID sought to use non-emergency assistance to preempt the need for emergency food aid flows. Second, having non-emergency food aid distribution pipelines in place and operational already conveys considerable administrative and logistical advantages in mounting effective and rapid emergency response when a disaster strikes or a conflict erupts (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005).

A second major concern is NQ's claim that the modest, statistically insignificant negative association between food aid and conflict in their OLS estimates suffers significant *negative* bias. The NQ explanation for that claim is the possibility that donors condition food aid flows on characteristics correlated with low levels of conflict, i.e., that the US actively seeks to avoid sending foreign aid to conflict-affected countries. This explanation directly contradicts USAID's Food for Peace program's stated objective "FFP provides emergency food assistance to those affected by *conflict* and natural disasters and provides development food assistance to address the underlying causes of hunger." (USAID, 2015, emphasis added) In the NQ dataset, less than 22% of countries experience conflict in the average year, and yet between 1975 and 2006, there were only two years when there were more countries receiving food aid and not experiencing conflict than countries who were both receiving food aid and experiencing conflict. So their explanation does not appear to square with the data.

Indeed, as US food aid under PL480 shifted from Title I in-kind concessional lending to governments to Title II emergency assistance through PVO/NGOs and WFP, food aid has grown increasingly concentrated on populations dealing with conflict, contrary to the NQ hypothesis. If food aid deliveries intentionally directed toward countries that have conflict rather than away from such countries, reconciling a positive IV coefficient with a negative OLS coefficient becomes difficult. If humanitarian assistance during conflict is a primary source of endogeneity, one would

have expected the OLS coefficient to be upward biased rather than downward as would be implied by NQ's reported effects.

The fact that the 2SLS estimates increase relative to the OLS ones suggests either spurious regressions, or an odd, rather implausible negative selection mechanism wherein logistical, safety and other concerns about shipping food aid to conflict-affected countries overrides published policy. No evidence is provided to support the claim of negative selection. And the shift-share instrument NQ does not seem to satisfy the exclusion restriction, being vulnerable to reverse causality and thus the Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018) critique and the bias we demonstrate arises in panel IV estimation when spurious regressions occur in conjunction with reverse causality between the dependent variable and the endogenous regressor for which one instruments.

Step 3: Identify candidate causal mechanisms and instrument(s); if possible, run placebo tests

In NQ, the mechanism driving variation comes from US government wheat price stabilization policies – established for exogenous reasons entirely unrelated to US food aid programs (Barrett and Maxwell 2005) – that for many years obliged the USDA to purchase food in high production years when commodity prices fell. NQ argue that windfall wheat production resulted in extra government-held wheat stocks which were subsequently shipped abroad as food aid, with year-on-year perturbations absorbed by food aid shipments supporting countries that are the most regular recipients of US food aid. NQ then sensibly exploit the resulting difference in additional food aid allocations between high and low US wheat production years across regular and irregular food aid recipients to try to identify a causal effect of food aid on conflict in recipient countries.

The US long had a policy of agricultural commodity price supports that indeed created a link between aggregate annual production and government procurement of wheat that was subsequently used as food aid; indeed, surplus disposal was an explicit policy objective of the main US food aid program launched in 1954 (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005). But US commodity price stabilization and food aid policies experienced dramatic changes during the sample period NQ study. And the US operates several different food aid programs with important differences in features that make some more or less relevant to the causal mechanism NQ propose. These intertemporal changes and inter-program differences create opportunities to run placebo tests of the hypothesized causal mechanism.

In practice, policies that link production to US government procurement were not in place for the entire duration of the NQ study period. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the start of the NQ time series, purchases took place through USDA's system of non-recourse loans, which were essentially loans that the USDA made to US farmers through the USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC).⁶ The USDA would purchase a farmer's grain production at a fixed rate if the market price fell below that rate. In order to avoid having these large reserves putting downward pressure on future grain prices, the USDA donated commodity stocks to countries beyond its commercial marketshed as food aid through Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, and subsequently through the food aid programs authorized under Public Law 480 (PL480), passed in 1954, which thereafter became – and continues today as – the principal vehicle for US food aid shipments. Section 416(b) and PL480 shipments driven by surplus disposal objectives thus became the primary connection between food aid and civil conflict (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005; Schnepf, 2014). In this system, USDA wheat purchases (i.e., grain forfeitures for nonpayment of non-recourse commodity loans) were a function not only of the price, but also of the underlying loan rates. However, the only period during the NQ study window when loan rates fluctuated around market prices was a brief window between 1981 and 1986 (Westcott and Hoffman, 1999). This led government stocks of wheat to climb sharply, with government stocks reaching 62% of average annual wheat production 1981-1987 (Wescott and Hoffman, 1999). This represented a peak for government intervention in wheat markets, sparking changes to federal farm price support programs in the mid-1980s.

High levels of procurement during that period and the excessive stocks that resulted led to market reforms that de-linked wheat production and US food aid procurement, particularly following the Farm Bills in 1985 and 1990. Finally, the 1996 Farm Bill uncoupled the link between wheat production and government held stocks for good (Willis and O'Brien, 2015). CCC stocks of wheat were fully exhausted by 2006, and indeed, the Section 416(b) food aid program has been inactive since 2007 because of the unavailability of CCC-owned grain stocks (Schnepf, 2014).

⁶ A farmer could take out a non-recourse commodity loan proportionate to his or her harvested quantity of wheat at a fixed unit rate with the grain held as collateral. Within a nine-month window, if the selling price of grain dipped below the loan repayment rate, the farmer could forfeit the grain rather than repay the loan. Effectively, this guaranteed the farmer the minimum of the rate fixed by CCC or the world price, and caused the CCC to purchase wheat when market prices were low. Government procurement was therefore a function not only of production and prices, but also of the level at which CCC set the loan repayment rate, a policy variable subject to revision in various Farm Bills.

Since the early 1990s, the vast majority of US food aid has been procured by USDA on open market tenders announced in the Federal Register (Barrett and Maxwell 2005).

Given that federal law began to unravel the link between wheat prices (and therefore wheat production) and government commodity procurement for use in food aid programs starting with the 1985 Food Bill and severed it in the 1996 Food Bill, if the mechanism NQ posit indeed drove their findings, then the first stage of NQ's IV strategy should be strongest prior to 1985 and non-existent after 1996. That turns out not to be the case. The post-1996 estimation offers a natural placebo test since the causal mechanism did not exist during that sub-sample.

Table B1 implements this simple robustness check by reproducing the first stage of the NQ strategy dividing the sample into three periods corresponding to the passage of the Farm Bills that successively decoupled US wheat production from government held wheat stocks. As expected, the connection between wheat production and food aid shipments is strongest prior to 1985 but statistically insignificant. In the years 1985 to 1996 the effect turns negative and statistically insignificant. The estimated relationship is inexplicably similar to the NQ baseline result in the post 1996 period but still not statistically significant. Indeed, there is no statistically significant difference between the sub-period when the pre-1985 sub-period when mechanism was in force and the post-1996 sub-period when it was not. The fact that we see a relationship between wheat

TABLE B1: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSTRUMENT AND FOOD AID SHIPMENTS BY FARM BILL ERA

VARIABLES	(1) US food aid (1,000 MT)	(2) US food aid (1,000 MT)	(3) US food aid (1,000 MT)	(4) US food aid (1,000 MT)	(5) US food aid (1,000 MT)
<i>Panel A: Pre-1985</i>					
Baseline interaction instrument	0.00416 (0.00290)	0.00261 (0.00181)	0.00262 (0.00195)	0.00216 (0.00148)	0.00256 (0.00175)
Observations	1,460	1,460	1,460	1,460	1,460
R-squared	0.73574	0.73809	0.75020	0.75813	0.76167
<i>Panel B: 1985 to 1996</i>					
Baseline interaction instrument	-0.00043 (0.00132)	-0.00211 (0.00214)	-0.00261 (0.00274)	-0.00192 (0.00229)	-0.00218 (0.00246)
Observations	1,384	1,384	1,384	1,384	1,384
R-squared	0.60490	0.63565	0.65284	0.65952	0.66482
<i>Panel C: Post-1996</i>					
Baseline interaction instrument	0.00149 (0.00083)	0.00039 (0.00076)	0.00100 (0.00094)	0.00165 (0.00107)	0.00181 (0.00114)
Observations	1,245	1,245	1,245	1,245	1,245
R-squared	0.69145	0.69852	0.72413	0.73353	0.73564
Controls (for all panels):					
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
US real per capita GDP x avg. prob. of any US food aid	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
US Democratic president x. avg. prob. of any US food aid	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Oil price x avg. prob. of any US food aid	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Monthly recipient temperature and precipitation	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Monthly weather x avg. prob. Of any US food aid	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Avg. US military aid x year FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Avg. US economic aid x year FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Avg. recipient cereal imports x year FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Avg. recipient cereal production x year FE	No	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: The sample includes 125 non-OECD countries for the years 1971-1984 (panel A), 1985 to 1996 (Panel B), and 1997 to 2006 (Panel C). Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.

production and wheat food aid shipments after the US formally ended the policy link that underpins NQ's identification strategy suggests that the first stage probably identifies off spurious correlation not related to the claimed exogenous policy mechanism. The fact that likewise calls into question

the salience of the mechanism NQ use to support the relevance of the instrument, which could equally – and more plausibly? – arise from spurious time series correlation.

The NQ strategy does not hold only in the sub-period in which the true policy regime was closest to the one they describe, and not in the sub-period when that regime was not in effect. The failed placebo test enabled by exogenous policy change strongly signals that their results likely stem from some source of variation other than US commodity price stabilization and associated food aid policy. Furthermore, the type of policy regime they have in mind effectively ended in the mid-1990s, calling into question the current policy relevance of their results given dramatic changes in the way aid is distributed in recent decades.

Another type of placebo test might be feasible by exploiting variation among the US' various food aid programs. Food aid from the US is procured and distributed under multiple policies, each with its own legal authorization, priorities, and processes. Both historically and today, the bulk of food aid is distributed through PL480, which authorizes procurement and distribution of aid by USDA, along with distribution of Title II of PL480 by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005). But PL480 consists of several titles which describe very different forms of aid.

Aid distributed by USDA through Title I of PL480 provides concessional sales of food aid directly to foreign governments. Recipient governments have historically sold off the vast majority of Title I food aid, treating these more as balance of payments transfers in kind than as food for direct distribution. Title I aid constituted the majority of food aid in the early period of NQ's study, accounting for 63% of US international Food Assistance Outlays between 1970 and 1979 (Schnepf, 2014). But the role of this direct-to-government concessional aid declined precipitously over the period and no allocations at all have occurred under Title I since 2006.

In contrast to Title I the role of aid distributed through Title II of PL480 has increased dramatically. Title II permits USAID to allocate aid in response to humanitarian emergencies and non-emergency food insecurity as an outright grant. Unlike Title I, the vast majority of Title II food aid shipments are directly distributed to food consumers. Today only the statutory minimum of 15% of Title II non-emergency shipments are sold ('monetized' in food aid jargon). Title II aid is delivered through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) like CARE, Catholic Relief Services, or World Vision, or through intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations' World Food Programme (WFP) rather than directly to

country governments. Title II accounted for less than 40% of US international food assistance outlays in 1970-1979, but accounts for 88% of food assistance today (Schnepf, 2014).

If food aid distributed to governments is more likely to fuel conflict (either because it is easier to steal or because governments use the food to feed their own troops or the proceeds of food aid sales to finance military operations) then it would make sense to disaggregate food aid flows among programs and run the placebo test using Title II flows as a placebo. Because the transition from Title I to Title II food aid was largely coincident with the change in US farm policy that ended government wheat stocks – although these contemporaneous changes were driven by different political and economic phenomena (Barrett and Maxwell 2005) – and the data disaggregated between Title I, Title II, and other food aid program flows are not publically available, we defer just to the period-specific placebo test. One would expect that predominantly Title I PL480 food aid in the 1970s-1985 would be more likely to fuel conflict than mainly Title II PL 480 food aid in the post-1996 period. That would be consistent with the sub-period disaggregated effects we found in step 1 but that we could not corroborate in the sub-period placebo test just reported. But such a finding does not imply that the food aid distribution system that prevails today would have this effect; this would merely offer an explanation for a historical relationship.

Table B2 reproduces NQ's IV estimate of the relationship between food aid and conflict, but splitting the sample by the same periods as in Table B1. Consistent with the lack of a strong first stage relationship, we find no relationship between aid and conflict in the period between the 1985 and 1996 Food Bills. As expected given that the instrument is strongest in the pre-1985 period, the coefficients on aid for this period are slightly bigger than those presented by NQ for the full sample. In the post 1996 period, the coefficient is also very close to the one in the NQ paper. The coefficient is not quite significant at standard levels, but given the smaller number of observations in that period, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equivalence of the coefficients prior to 1985 and following 1996. Strikingly, despite the fact that food aid was administered very differently in the 2000s than in the 1970s, the coefficients for these two periods are nearly identical. Thus, one is left with two possible conclusions. Either, the delivery mechanisms behind food aid is irrelevant to the degree to which food aid translates into elevated conflict – which seems unlikely – or the NQ IV strategy is picking up something other than a causal effect of aid on conflict.

TABLE B2: 2SLS ESTIMATES OF FOOD AID ON CONFLICT BY FARM BILL ERA

VARIABLES	(1) Any Conflict	(2) Any Conflict	(3) Any Conflict	(4) Any Conflict	(5) Any Conflict
<i>Panel A: Pre-1985</i>					
U.S. wheat aid (tonnes) - from FAO	0.00218 (0.00182)	0.00331 (0.00294)	0.00327 (0.00291)	0.00397 (0.00322)	0.00357 (0.00286)
Observations	1,460	1,460	1,460	1,460	1,460
R-squared	0.43882	0.20773	0.25901	0.12822	0.24196
KP F-Stat	2.050	2.078	1.813	2.140	2.138
<i>Panel B: 1985 to 1996</i>					
U.S. wheat aid (tonnes) - from FAO	0.00097 (0.00744)	-0.00140 (0.00241)	-0.00162 (0.00206)	-0.00415 (0.00465)	-0.00386 (0.00408)
Observations	1,384	1,384	1,384	1,384	1,384
R-squared	0.60715	0.63300	0.63867	0.34016	0.41052
KP F-Stat	0.106	0.968	0.901	0.700	0.790
<i>Panel C: Post-1996</i>					
U.S. wheat aid (tonnes) - from FAO	0.00457 (0.00301)	0.01265 (0.02416)	0.00567 (0.00600)	0.00368 (0.00322)	0.00281 (0.00258)
Observations	1,245	1,245	1,245	1,245	1,245
R-squared	0.56814	-0.43313	0.52204	0.65228	0.69256
KP F-Stat	3.219	0.256	1.141	2.384	2.527
Controls (for all panels):					
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
US real per capita GDP x avg. prob. of any US food aid	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
US Democratic president x. avg. prob. of any US food aid	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Oil price x avg. prob. of any US food aid	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Monthly recipient temperature and Precipitation	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Monthly weather x avg. prob. Of any US food aid	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Avg. US military aid x year FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Avg. US economic aid x year FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Avg. recipient cereal imports x year FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Avg. recipient cereal production x year FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Notes: An observation is a country and a year. The sample includes 125 non-OECD countries for the years 1971-1984 (panel A), 1985 to 1996 (Panel B), and 1997 to 2006 (Panel C). Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. In these shorter panels, collinearities arising when adding country characteristics cause fixed effects for several countries to be dropped, leading to the change in r-squared from column 4 to 5.					

Step 4: Test for trend and difference stationarity

As appendix A explained, including year fixed effects does not eliminate the influence of seemingly spurious correlation between US wheat production and recipient country conflict because both variables display a similar inverted-U shape trend over the period, and, crucially, this trend is much more pronounced for regular aid recipients than for irregular ones. Including region-year and country fixed effects, even a time trend variable, does not permit causal identification unless either (i) the controls employed by NQ absorb all of the trend effects other than aid, or (ii) inter-annual US wheat production fluctuations and resulting food aid are in fact the dominant sources of the conflict trends.

These assumptions are much stronger than those described by NQ as the necessary and sufficient conditions for their strategy to reveal a causal effect of aid on conflict. Because the causal effect of aid on conflict is a relationship of substantial interest to policy makers, and because the clever econometric trick they employ appears in other empirical papers on other topics, we deem it important to highlight the caveats to the NQ conclusions and to demonstrate their vulnerability to spurious correlation due to nonlinear heterogeneous trends unrelated to the hypothesized mechanism.

NQ report results controlling for a linear trend, for lagged dependent variables, and using other conventional controls without testing for trend or difference stationarity in the underlying series. However, they never demonstrate that these are the correct specifications for the kinds of trends we should worry about. For example, controlling for a lagged dependent variable might be appropriate if the conflict series is non-stationary, but wheat production and wheat aid are stationary. Here we recommend the set of tests from time series literature that are appropriate for diagnosing issues of non-stationary processes and apply them to the NQ data.

When implementing a panel IV estimation where the variation comes from a time series, a reasonable sequence of steps authors might follow to assess the stationarity of the underlying data includes:

1. Conduct an augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test on the uninteracted time series instrumental variable (i.e., lagged US wheat production). If the ADF test rejects the null of a random walk or other non-stationary process, the authors should report the uninteracted IV specification including the F-statistic for weak identification, which should be at least 10. If the ADF test fails to reject the null hypothesis of a random walk, then spurious correlation is likely in the uninteracted IV regression case, and the authors should test for non-stationarity in panel variables.

2. Conduct a Hadri test on the interacted instrument, endogenous explanatory variable (i.e., wheat food aid), and outcome variable (i.e., conflict). If the test rejects the null hypothesis that all panels are stationary for either the interacted instrument or the outcome variable, then there is at least some risk of spurious correlation in the interacted IV specification.
3. Conduct a Fisher-type panel unit root test on the interacted instrument, endogenous explanatory variable (i.e., wheat food aid), and outcome variable (i.e., conflict). If the test fails to reject the null hypothesis that all panels have a unit root for one of these variables, this is strong evidence that this variable should be differenced until the subsequent test does reject the null appropriate to that order of integration. If the test rejects the null that all variables have the same unit root, one cannot rely on a single specification of a parametric time trend to solve the unit root problem that exists in only some of the country-specific time series. We are unaware of a test that can estimate the risk of mistaken inference from having a subset of countries follow a unit root due to a shared latent process. So we recommend assessing this risk through bootstrap and randomized placebo tests or simulation of the assumed data generating process.

We apply these steps to the NQ data by testing for non-stationarity in the lagged US wheat production variable. The workhorse method to test for non-stationarity in a single time series is the ADF test. ADF tests are based on regressions of the following form:

$$\Delta y_t = \alpha + \delta t + \lambda y_{t-1} + \chi_t \quad (\text{B3})$$

The null hypothesis is that y_t follows a random walk, which means that the lagged value y_{t-1} has no explanatory power about changes in y_{t-1} between periods $t-1$ and t . Failure to reject the null hypothesis that $\beta = 0$ therefore indicates failure to reject the random walk hypothesis. Different versions of the ADF test impose restrictions that $\alpha = 0, \delta = 0$ (no constant), $\alpha \neq 0, \delta = 0$ (constant), or $\alpha = 0, \delta \neq 0$ (trend). An additional version imposes a modified null hypothesis that y follows a random walk plus non-zero drift, which uses the same regression model as the constant form of the test but implies different critical values.

Table B3 below shows the critical values for each version of this test using the data originally included in NQ. Because conflict and wheat food aid are different for each country, we average these variables across countries at the yearly level into a single time series. The test is therefore whether the proportion of countries experiencing conflict or the average wheat food aid receipts follows a random walk. Only the drift model rejects the random walk plus non-zero drift for all versions of the test. When we impose the hypothesis that these variables follow a random walk without drift, we cannot reject the null for conflict and wheat food aid for any version of the ADF test.

Table B3: ADF Test Results on NQ Data

	No Constant	Constant	Trend	Drift
US Wheat Production in year t-1 (metric tons)	-0.088	-3.543**	-3.376*	-3.543***
Proportion of countries experiencing conflict in year t	-0.297	-1.660	-1.503	-1.660*
Average receipt of US wheat food aid in year t (metric tons)	-1.271	-2.014	-2.443	-2.014**
1% critical value	-2.644	-3.682	-4.288	-2.445
5% critical value	-1.95	-2.972	-3.56	-1.692
10% critical value	-1.604	-2.618	-3.216	-1.308

Notes: Reports ADF test coefficient estimates for the three variables indicated in rows. *, **, and *** indicate rejection of the unit root null hypothesis at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively, relative to the appropriate critical values indicated in the bottom rows. Columns indicate the ADF model specified for the critical value. All tests run with Stata's `dfuller` command. N=35 for each test, covering the years in the 1971-2006 time series NQ use.

Since we cannot reject the null hypothesis that lagged US wheat production follows a random walk without drift, spurious correlation becomes a concern. Any trend among regular aid recipients that is not also common to infrequent recipients of aid could be spuriously correlated with the dynamics of wheat production. Even if controlling for the trend or lagged dependent variables corrects this non-stationarity, the F-statistic for weak instruments in the uninteracted case is well below 10 (F=1.83 to 3.44 over reported specifications), meaning that the uninteracted specification is vulnerable to both spurious regression and weak instruments problems.

Interacting lagged US wheat production with the country-specific regularity of food aid receipt transforms the instrument from a time series variable into a panel variable. Conflict and aid receipts are both also panel variables as they vary both within countries over time and within years across countries. The question then becomes whether a spurious regression problem exists in the panels and whether existing time series tests can be used to diagnose these problems.

A range of tests exist to diagnose unit root processes in panel data. The ideal test would tell us the following four features of the data for each of the three main variables:

1. Do any countries show evidence a unit root or other non-stationary dynamic process in their time series for this variable?
2. What share of countries show evidence of a non-stationary process?

3. What is the expected rate of over-rejection using conventional inference tests (t-tests for significance of first stage and reduced form, F test for weak identification) if not accounting for the share of countries whose time series may have nonstationary processes?
4. If dynamics are correlated across countries, what is the size of the possible bias that could result?

Unfortunately, existing tests generally are based on sharp null hypotheses. A Hadri test statistic relates to the null hypothesis that the time series for *every* (country-specific) panel is stationary, providing a test for question (1). Applied to the NQ data, this test rejects the null hypothesis for all three main variables, conflict, quantity of wheat food aid received, and lagged production of US wheat interacted with regularity of food aid receipts, each with $p < 0.0001$. This tells us that were we to implement the IV strategy by regressing conflict and wheat food aid on lagged US wheat production for one country at a time, at least one such regression would suffer from spurious correlation. Unfortunately, this test does not reveal the share of countries whose time series reflect a unit root nor does it convey information about the extent of any inference and bias issues which could result, leaving questions (2) and (3) open.

By contrast, a Fisher-style panel unit root test computes the ADF statistic for the time series of each panel one at a time and then provides a test statistic for the null hypothesis that a unit root process exists for *all* time series. The Fisher-style test rejects the null of a unit root for *all* panels. Given that the Hadri test gives strong evidence that at least one country has a unit root process for each of the main variables, the Fisher-test tells us that different countries follow different processes. They neither are all stationary nor all following the same unit root process. Failure to reject the null with a Fisher-style test would provide strong evidence that each of the key variables should be differenced until stationary. In the NQ data, the Fisher-style test with one lag rejects the null for each of the major variables: conflict, wheat food aid deliveries, and lagged US wheat production interacted with regularity of aid receipts, each with $p < 0.0001$.

While this rejection does not provide strong guidance in favor of differencing the variables, it also means that controlling for common time trends through either parametric specifications of time effects or non-parametric year “fixed effects” are unlikely to address the risk of spurious correlation. Because not all variables have the unit root, the unit root processes cannot be common to all countries and thus has no clean corrective.

In summary, the guidance from existing panel tests for unit roots is ambiguous in the NQ data. The ADF test on wheat food aid suggests that uninteracted US wheat production should not be used alone as an instrument because of the risk of spurious correlation. The Hadri test suggests that NQ's choice to interact with frequency of aid receipts does not fully address the problem, because we cannot reject a unit root for at least one country. The Fisher-style test tells us that controlling for common time trends alone will not address problems that arise due to unit roots in some, but not all, of the country-specific time series. Because not all countries share the same unit root, solutions that assume all countries share the same unit root – such as such as fixed effects – will not solve the problem.

Unfortunately, all existing tests we are aware of measure neither the share of countries whose time series follows a unit root or other nonstationary process nor the risk to inference or bias that would arise from a given share. We can conduct the ADF test separately for each main variable and each country and report the share where we fail to reject the null of random walk for that country. For the main variables, using an ADF test with no drift, the share of countries in which we fail to reject the null of a random walk at a 5% level are 57% for conflict, 53% for wheat food aid, and 12% for the interacted instrument. This offers no support for the absence of correction for nonstationarity in the original NQ estimates.

Table B4: ADF test results by regularity of food aid receipt

	Below median food aid receipt regularity	Above median food aid receipt regularity
Average proportion of years in which aid was received by countries	0.10	0.62
Average proportion of years in which countries experience a war	0.15	0.27
Average quantity of wheat food aid received (MT)	1.67	49.27
Average value of interacted instrument (regularity of aid receipts x lagged US wheat production (MT))	5940.47	36508.89
Proportion of countries whose ADF test on the conflict time series has $p > .05$	0.54	0.59
Proportion of countries whose ADF test on the interacted instrument time series has $p > .05$	0.11	0.12
Proportion of countries whose ADF test on the wheat aid time series has $p > .05$	0.61	0.45

The last natural question is whether these tests suggest that the unit root process is equally common among regular recipients and irregular recipients. If these patterns were similar, we might think that any bias or inference issues would “difference out” by comparing regular versus irregular recipients. Table B4 shows the share of countries where we fail to reject the null hypothesis of a random walk for each variable, splitting by whether regularity is above or below median. The rates of rejecting the random walk hypothesis in these data do not differ dramatically between above and below median regularity of aid receipts. However, such a comparison does not tell us what difference would be big enough to cause a problem or whether the median is the right stratification point for comparison.

Because existing panel IV tests impose sharp null hypotheses, they can only signal a risk of spurious correlation, but do they cannot estimate the risk of bias or mistaken inference due to spurious regressions. We therefore turn to methods based on bootstrap, placebo randomization, and Monte Carlo simulation to study the risks to inference and bias in these data.

Given that time series tests reveal a risk of nonstationarity in the primary variables, an assessment of the NQ results should report which trends can be distinguished from NQs reported results. As we demonstrated in Table 3, re-estimating the NQ model using first-differenced series overturns their core findings. But even if one just includes a quadratic rather than a linear trend in their regressions, without first-differencing, their results evaporate. The confidence intervals explode to include both coefficients that are more than 10 and -10 times their coefficient estimate, and a weak instruments test signals a high risk of spurious correlations (Cragg-Donald F statistic = 0.242). This result implies that any effect NQ identify cannot be distinguished from any other that might exhibit a quadratic trend, including both random cycles arising from summed errors over years or omitted variables with quadratic trends.

Furthermore, in the specifications NQ report for the uninteracted case, all reported F-statistics are below four, suggesting a weak instrument. When the interaction is introduced, the reported F-statistic increases above the usual benchmark of ten for two out of five reported specifications with different controls. In our simulations, the interaction does not eliminate the bias from spurious correlation due to trends. Searching for specifications with different interactions that could plausibly be linked to the proposed instruments creates a risk that instruments that are spuriously associated with the causal variable are reported with an artificially high level of confidence. Another way to put this is that interactions give researchers

degrees of freedom to search for “splits” of the data that pick up those panels at risk of spurious correlation to inflate the F-statistics. To give a simple example in the NQ data, over 31.5% of countries do not experience any conflict in the dataset and 14.2% of countries never receive any wheat aid. In a model without year fixed effects, the time series for these variables will be strongly stationary, and so will not be spuriously correlated with wheat production. Interacting wheat production with a variable that downweights countries with no aid or conflict will, however, increase the F-statistic by increasing the weight placed on the panels where spurious correlation is a real risk.

Step 5: Run Young’s bootstrap test for overleveraged observations

As explained in the main text, the appropriate concern Young (2018) raises about the possibility of over-leveraged observations merits exploration in any IV estimation study. But that problem is quite distinct from the spurious regressions problem that motivates this paper.

NQ’s results pass Young’s test. Here we report what Young calls the bootstrap-c, which equals one minus the share of bootstrap iterations for which the coefficient estimated in a given bootstrap sample is greater than zero. Figure B7 shows the distribution of 2SLS estimates obtained by dropping each of the 127 countries one at a time and estimating the NQ 2SLS without those observations. This procedure always returns a positive coefficient of aid on conflict when excluding any single country from the analysis. The bootstrap-c p-value when bootstrapping over countries is 0.048, which is greater than NQ’s reported p-value, but still significant at the five percent level. We favor running leave-one-out tests at the country level because that’s the unit NQ cluster. If we instead treat the relevant clusters as years rather than countries, similar results obtain. The coefficient estimates are never negative when leaving any one year out, and the bootstrap-c p-value is 0.018. So leveraged country observations is not an issue in the NQ 2SLS estimates.




Figure B7: Kernel density estimate of Young's bootstrap-c p-values

Step 6: Check the instrument using a randomized placebo test

The randomization placebo test we introduce rests on the simple principle that introducing randomness into the endogenous explanatory variable of interest (in the NQ case, a country's food aid receipts in a given year) while holding constant the (potentially endogenous) cross-sectional exposure variable (\bar{D}_{ir}), the instrument (US wheat production) and everything else should eliminate the estimated causal relationship if indeed exogenous inter-annual shocks to the endogenous explanatory variable (wheat food aid shipments) drive outcomes (conflict in recipient countries). So within a given year, we hold constant the following variables: the quantity of wheat produced, the identity of the countries that receive any wheat food aid from the US (thereby fixing both \bar{D}_{ir} and the timing of food aid receipts), observable fixed and time-varying characteristics of countries, and the aggregate distribution of wheat food aid allocations across all countries each year. But we randomly assign the key variable of interest, the quantity of aid delivered to *a particular country*. For example, in 1971, 60 countries received any wheat food aid from the US. In our simulation, we randomly reassign (without replacement) the

quantity of wheat aid deliveries among these 60 countries, while holding constant the (true) zero value of food aid receipts in the other countries. For example, instead of receiving the 2,100 tons it actually received in 1971, Nepal could be randomly assigned the 800 tons actually shipped to Swaziland that year. We similarly reshuffle the wheat aid allocations among the 62 countries who received aid in 1972, and so on for every year in the sample.

The resulting pseudo-data set preserves the two sources of endogeneity we worry about – time trends and endogenous selection into being a regular food aid recipient – but sweeps out the source of variation that NQ have in mind by randomizing among countries the assignment of specific food aid shipment volumes. To keep with the earlier example, Swaziland’s food aid receipts cannot plausibly have caused civil conflict within Nepal. This way, conflict can remain spuriously related to wheat production because neither the conflict time series nor the wheat production time series nor the exposure variable that distinguishes between groups are altered, but the causal mechanism has been rendered non-operational by randomization since it is no longer the case that in expectation particular countries receive the randomly generated additional aid in a given year. In this placebo test, the only reason why the quantity of wheat aid delivered would be positively related to conflict in NQ’s baseline 2SLS specification would be that countries that regularly experience conflict are also the countries that regularly receive food aid (which is what we would expect if aid were targeted to humanitarian crises) and the years of high wheat production happen to be years in which conflict is elevated (which with only 36 years and strong trends could well be spurious).

Figure B8 shows the distribution of coefficient estimates generated by 1,000 randomizations of food aid allocations and then (re-)estimating the baseline 2SLS model. If the true causal relationship between food aid allocations and conflict were positive and the identification was otherwise unaffected by selection bias and spurious time trends, the distribution of coefficients would shift left relative to the NQ coefficient estimate – and if the share of countries in which aid causes conflict is small relative to a large enough sample, would center around zero – because the randomization of food aid allocations would attenuate the estimated relationship between aid and conflict. Instead, we find the opposite. The distribution of parameter estimates clearly shifts to the right of the NQ 2SLS coefficient estimate. This implies that the identity of aid recipient countries and the overall trends in global conflict prevalence, US wheat production, and total food aid deliveries drive the estimated relationship, not inter-annual

fluctuations in food aid receipts by a given country. Indeed, to the extent that the IV does contain some component of random aid allocation, this test also signals that the true association between inter-annual variation in food aid receipts and conflict must be negative since eliminating that source of variation causes an increase in coefficient estimates.




FIGURE B8: DISTRIBUTION OF 2SLS COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES USING RANDOMIZED FOOD AID ALLOCATIONS

Notes: The density plot depicts the distribution of 2SLS coefficient estimates using the set of baseline controls with 1,000 draws of randomized allocations of wheat aid food volumes among actual recipients in a particular year. The dark shaded area indicates the bottom and top 5% of draws. The light shaded area shows the top and bottom 10%. The kernel density function and percentiles are estimated on the full set of 1,000 iterations, but the plot trims the largest 20 and smallest 15 values of the distribution for scale.

Step 7: Monte Carlo placebo tests: simulation after eliminating or reversing the causal mechanism

As the placebo tests based on randomizing food aid allocations demonstrate, what really seems to drive the NQ findings is the fact that conflict incidence follows nonlinear trends that differ between irregular and regular recipients of aid, with the pattern for regular recipients cyclical with US wheat production and food aid shipments. As we show in section I of the main paper, any variable that exhibited a similar inverted-U (or U)-shaped time series pattern over the sample period would “work” as an instrument, no matter how spurious the association with food aid shipments. In order to show that NQ’s IV approach identifies only spurious correlation and not

a causal effect, we now build a simple model that replicates key features of the underlying data, but intentionally break – and then reverse – the hypothesized causal relation between food aid flows and conflict. This allows us to know the true data generating process (DGP). We then generate pseudo-data from that DGP and replicate the NQ estimation strategy 100 times to generate a distribution of estimation results. When the DGP by construction has food aid statistically independent of conflict, this provides an attractive placebo test.

Suppose that wheat production follows the following pattern:

$$\text{Wheat}_{it} = f(t) + h_t \quad (\text{B4})$$

Where $f(t)$ is a function of time and h is a random variable distributed $N(0,1)$ that is independently distributed across years. Define a random variable $f_t = f(t)$ for a fixed time period that over the study period where the variance of f_t over the studied period, σ_f , is substantially larger than the variance of h_t , σ_h . In such a framework, observations of wheat production that are temporally proximate are strongly related due to the underlying trend, f_t , while most of the idiosyncratic variation in wheat production occurs as relatively moderate deviations around the mean. This describes a basic pattern of the NQ data, as shown in Figure 3 in the main paper. In our simple model conflict occurs whenever a latent variable representing conflict risk exceeds a threshold, where conflict risk is also subject to trends as follows:

$$\text{Conflict}_{it} = 0 \text{ if } R_{it} < \quad (\text{B5})$$

$$\text{Conflict}_{it} = 1 \text{ if } R_{it} > \bar{R} \text{ where } R_{it} = a_i * v_t \quad (\text{B6})$$

and a_i is a random variable uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 and specific to countries which captures each country's vulnerability to outbreak of conflict induced by a globally common shock v_t . We refer to a_i as fragility as it represents a country's specific risk to factors that affect conflict. v_t is the globally common shock to countries and consists of a trending component and a temporally idiosyncratic component such that $v_t = g(t) + j_t$. As with wheat production, $j_t \sim N(0,1)$, and we consider a context where if we define g_t as a random variable defined by $g(t)$ for a range of years, then within the study period σ_g is substantially larger than σ_j . Modeling conflict this way

matches a feature of the data, as described in step 4 above, that conflict prevalence is similar in adjacent periods and a large portion of the time series variance is explained by long-term trends.

The main worry in identifying the causal effect of aid on conflict is that aid may be directed toward countries that experience additional conflict. To capture this concern, we model aid, following stated US government policy, as determined by conflict and assess whether NQ's IV strategy removes the bias from this source. To capture the simultaneous relationship:

$$\text{aid}_{it} = \text{Max}(0, \text{Conflict}_{it} * U_{it}) \quad (\text{B7})$$

where $U_{it} \sim N(0,1)$. The function describing aid allocation has three features. 1. Countries that are not experiencing conflict never receive aid, i.e., aid is only sent to countries experiencing conflict,⁷ 2. Some countries that experience conflict do not receive aid for exogenous reasons on account of a low draw for j_{it} (which can be thought of as features of the current political relationship with the US, for example). 3. The amount of aid received conditional on non-zero aid receipt can be random and independent of a country's risk of conflict and can be determined by factors other than conflict, such as politics or ease of transport, here modeled as a high draw for j_{it} .

To show how the time trends arising from the functions $f(t)$ and $g(t)$ can influence the NQ results, we choose functional forms for these components that correspond approximately to patterns observed in the data, and show through Monte Carlo simulations that NQ's results are reproducible without the need to assume any causal effect of aid on conflict or any correlation beyond those above. Indeed, below we even introduce a negative causal effect of aid on conflict – the opposite of what NQ claim to find – and show that we can still replicate their findings.

In the first simulations, we assume that $g(t) = f(t) = t - (1/36) * t^2$ where $t = 1 \dots 36$. This form forces both prevalence of conflict and wheat production to follow an inverted “U” shape over a time horizon of 36 periods, the number of years in the dataset. The plots below simulate one draw of a pseudo-dataset with 126 countries and 36 years for this model to show how the conflict and wheat production dynamics work. Figure B9 shows how the secular trend $g(t)$ and the country-

⁷ This is an oversimplification of the real aid process. In the NQ dataset, countries that are not experiencing conflict also receive aid, but the percentage of countries receiving aid is substantially and statistically significantly higher in countries that are experiencing conflict than in countries that are not (47.0% vs. 34.6%). We will soon relax this assumption to show that allowing components of aid to be unrelated to conflict does not change the estimation results and can explain other features of the results reported by NQ.

specific conflict vulnerability combine to determine conflict risk. Dark shaded dots are countries with high fragility, a_i , while lighter shaded dots are less fragile countries, those with a low a_i . Within any year, some countries are at greater risk of conflict than others because of their higher fragility, represented by the fact that dark dots always appear higher than light dots on the vertical axis. Any dots above the horizontal line are those whose conflict risk exceeds the threshold and are considered to be in active conflict. Across years, the overall risk of conflict is increasing in early periods and falling in later periods as shown by the shift of the dark dots up the vertical (conflict risk) axis in the first half of the period and shift down in the second half. The consequence of this DGP is that some (high fragility) countries nearly always experience conflict and some low fragility ones are almost never in conflict, but because of the secular trend, the countries with similar conflict risk tend to enter and exit the conflict state in the same years. Once a country enters conflict, it tends to remain so until global conditions improve enough to bring it back below the conflict threshold.




FIGURE B9: SIMULATED RISK OF CONFLICT OVER TIME BY FRAGILITY LEVEL IN THE MODEL

Because we imposed an inverted “U” shaped trend for $g(t)$ and $f(t)$, conflict and wheat both follow a pattern of starting and finishing the period at low levels and peak in the middle of the period, as shown in Figure B10. This corresponds with observable patterns in wheat production and conflict in the 36-year period in the NQ data. Because we have chosen forms such that $\sigma_g > \sigma_j$ and $\sigma_f > \sigma_h$, the variance in both conflict and wheat is dominated by the trend rather than by year-on-year idiosyncratic variation around the trend, as is true in the actual data.

In this model, there is no true causal effect of aid on conflict in the DGP. If there is a correlation between aid and conflict, it comes from aid agencies preferring to send food aid to more conflict prone places. We now replicate NQ’s identification strategy by drawing 100 random



FIGURE B10: SIMULATED WHEAT PRODUCTION AND AVERAGE CONFLICT RISK IN THE MODEL

samples of 36 years and 126 countries using the model above and then estimate the relationship using 2SLS that mirrors NQ, with the following first state and reduced form equations:

$$aid_{it} = \pi^{mc}wheat_{it-1} * d + C_i + Year_t + M_{it} + \eta_{it}^{mc} \quad (B8)$$

μ_{it}^{mc}

$$\text{conflict}_{it} = \gamma^{mc} \text{wheat}_{it-1} + c_i + \text{year}_t + m_{it} + \mu_{it}^{mc} \quad (\text{B9})$$

where C_i and c_i are country fixed effects, Year_t and year_t are year fixed effects, and M_{it} and m_{it} are country and year level controls. Figure B11 plots the density of estimated β coefficients from the second stage for two specifications. The “parsimonious controls” specification includes only time and country fixed effects and the “lagged dependent variable” specification includes conflict in period $t-1$ as an additional control. This corresponds to the estimated coefficient of aid on conflict in the parsimonious specification of NQ’s IV strategy. The distribution of estimated instrumental variables estimators $\frac{\widehat{\gamma}^{mc}}{\widehat{\pi}^{mc}}$ never includes the true zero value; rather all the estimates of the relationship between aid and conflict are positive. The estimator clearly fails the placebo test. Including the year and time (region-year in NQ) fixed effects or the control for lagged conflict does not prevent the IV coefficient estimate from picking up the bias that arises from the endogenous determination of aid and conflict and the spurious correlation of the time series.




FIGURE B11: DISTRIBUTION OF SIMULATED COEFFICIENTS FOR IV SPECIFICATION OF SIMPLE MODEL

Notes: The plot displays the distribution of 100 simulated 2SLS coefficient estimates on instrumented aid from the IV specification. The parsimonious specification includes year and country fixed effects in both the first and second stage. The lagged dependent variable specification adds that AR(1) term to the parsimonious specification.

This simple model suffices to generate a strictly positive estimated relationship between aid and conflict even in the absence of a causal effect of aid on conflict. But a few additions are necessary to describe other key features of the data. In particular, in the simple model, the OLS relationship would always be positive, because in this model aid never flows to places that never experience conflict.⁸ But in the actual data, NQ find a negative, albeit statistically insignificant, OLS estimate associating food aid flows with conflict. NQ argue that the positive IV relationship is generated by a causal effect of aid on conflict while a small negative and insignificant OLS coefficient estimate is explained either by measurement error⁹ or following an unsubstantiated hypothesis that food aid programs are on average effective at targeting aid away from places where conflict is prevalent or at least away from places where aid causes conflict. Of course, the idea that USAID directs aid away from places at risk of conflict directly contradicts the stated objective of the agency and the patterns in the data, making this an unattractive candidate explanation.

Simple adjustments to our simulation model can generate the observed negative OLS coefficient and an upwardly biased IV estimate without the need to assume a causal effect of aid on conflict. In fact, the mechanism that generates the relationships in the extended case is an assumption that aid *prevents* some conflict, but coincident trends generate spurious correlation that dominates the IV estimation and obscures the true negative causal relationship between food aid flows and conflict. If one keeps all the components of the model but allows for some component of aid to be unrelated to conflict and allows for food aid flows to reduce the risk of conflict, the negative OLS relationship found by NQ can be generated by the model as well.

To show this, we modify the aid and conflict dynamics as follows:

$$\text{Aid}_{it} = \text{Max}(0, I(R_{it} > R) * j_{it}) + s_{it} \tag{B10}$$

Where $s_{it} = 2 * \text{Max}(0, n_{it})$ with probability .5

⁸ In our simulations of this baseline model where aid and conflict have a joint inverse-U trend, the IV estimates are always upward biased relative to OLS for the reasons explained in the main paper.

⁹ In order for measurement error in the conflict variable to drive the results, the measurement error would have to be systematic in such a way as to actually flip the sign of the observed relationships. It is not clear what would generate such measurement error in this context.

0 with probability .5

$$n_{it} \sim N(0,1)$$

The new aid function allows the possibility that not all food aid is determined by conflict. Rather, food aid flows can vary on both the intensive and extensive margin in idiosyncratic ways, for example because aid may be shipped as a response to natural disasters. The component of aid that arises for these reasons is described by s_{it} , which has two sources of idiosyncratic variation. The first part represents the part that is correlated with the quantity of the food aid shipment, for example, the intensity of a natural disaster. The second part is the exogenous reasons that a country with a positive draw of n_{it} will receive any aid or not. This is modeled by the fact that a given country in a given year that has a positive draw of n_{it} has a 50% chance of receiving aid and a 50% chance of not receiving aid.

In contrast to the earlier model, there are now two reasons that countries receive food aid. The proportion of countries experiencing conflict will vary by year, but in expectation, 50% of the countries experiencing conflict will receive some aid because of their conflict status. Aid for non-conflict reasons such as disasters does not systematically vary by time. In expectation, 50% of countries will experience a disaster that warrants aid shipments, and 50% of the countries that experience such a shock receive aid.

The second modification is that aid flows can prevent conflict, as food aid advocates hope. We now modify the model so that if a country receives aid for any reason, either because of a high risk of conflict or because of a disaster, it will not experience conflict in that year. Thus, all countries that would experience conflict (those with $R_{it} > R$) can receive aid, but only some receive it. Any countries that receive aid for this reason or because of the idiosyncratic component w_t will not experience conflict in that year so that:

$$\text{Conflict}_{it} = 0 \text{ if } \text{Aid}_{it} > 0 \tag{B11}$$

These modifications to the model capture several plausible features of the true DGP:

1. Countries that are at risk of conflict are likely to get aid for that reason.
2. Countries also receive aid for idiosyncratic reasons that are not related to conflict, such as political considerations, natural disasters, etc.

3. Aid can prevent conflict, for example by alleviating the conditions that cause people to fight or because delivery of US food aid is associated with actions and investments that control conflict, such as the deployment of peacekeeping troops.

Modifying the model in this way and repeating the Monte Carlo simulation 100 times leads to the distribution of OLS and IV coefficients shown in Figure B12. The OLS estimates from NQ's specification are now negative in all simulations, just as NQ find, reflecting the fact that although countries that experience conflict receive the most aid, they experience conflict only in the years when for exogenous reasons they do not actually receive aid. The negative OLS estimates capture the effects of aid flows that arise both because of conflict risk and other unrelated sources. The IV relationship remains positive due to the spurious regressions problem, just as in NQ. The instrument misleadingly focuses on differences in aid that are endogenous to conflict for two reasons. Countries that experience the most conflict are most likely to get aid and conflict and wheat production are spuriously correlated over time.




FIGURE B12: DISTRIBUTION OF SIMULATED COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR EXPANDED MODEL

Notes: The figure displays the distribution of 100 simulations of the OLS coefficient estimates along with 2SLS estimates under two specifications. The parsimonious specification includes year and country fixed effects in both the first and second stage. The lagged dependent variable specification adds that AR(1) term to the parsimonious specification. To keep the scale readable, the figure is produced dropping one coefficient estimate <-9 on the IV with lagged dependent variable .

These results highlight the fact that NQ's comparison of OLS and IV results does not compel a conclusion that food aid causes conflict. In fact, in the expanded model above, the same parameter estimate patterns they find appear in a context where aid actually *prevents* rather than causes conflict. So not only do the NQ estimates fail the Monte Carlo placebo test, they fail to replicate a known causal mechanism that reverses the direction of causality from the one they hypothesize. This directly reflects the problem, explained in the main paper, that spurious regression in the presence of reverse causality will bias panel IV estimates in the direction of the reverse causal correlation between the outcome variable (conflict) and the endogenous regressor aid), in this case, positive bias to the 2SLS estimates.

This Monte Carlo exercise underscores that one needs to carefully explore the longer-run time series patterns that might overwhelm the inter-annual variation used to identify true causal effects, thereby generating spurious correlation in panel IV estimates such as NQ's. Because wheat production and conflict in regular aid recipients both show pronounced, parallel trends in the time series, but the conflict incidence trend in irregular aid recipients does not parallel that of regular aid recipients – and aid receipt is endogenous – NQ's estimation strategy falls prey to the spurious regressions problem outlined in the main paper. This Monte Carlo result reinforces the conclusion of the preceding placebo tests.

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